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Foreword 
 
Global  outsourcing,  technical  change,  and  falling  barriers  to  trade  worldwide  have 
transformed the structure of production and global competition in the textile and apparel industry.  
This sector has experienced intense fragmentation in the last two decades.  Much of this global 
dispersal was driven by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA). The elimination of quotas on January 
1, 2005 has triggered a restructuring of existing patterns of sourcing and supply.  As buyers 
consolidate their sourcing strategies, and as smaller countries experience an erosion of apparel 
FDI post-MFA, many policy makers and companies are pointing to China’s tremendous surge in 
apparel exports in the first months of quota removal to argue that price, unit costs, and volumes 
appear to be crucial determinants of export competitiveness in the world without quotas.  This has 
led many firms to try to increase their scale of production in the hope of maintaining their place in 
the global division of labor in textiles and apparel. 
 
This  paper  reviews  a  growing  body  of  literature  that  focuses  on  the  institutional 
organization of global trade networks and production chains.  It shows that firms today face 
altered conditions of competition that are pushing them to compete on the basis of factors other 
than price and cost competitiveness.  In an environment with fragmented demand and volatile 
markets buyers are increasingly demanding good quality, variety, and timely delivery in addition 
to price.  Even the largest buyers (e.g., Walmart) require their suppliers to replenish their stocks 
rapidly – e.g., weekly and in short cycles.  Under these conditions large scales of operation can 
add  to  costs  unless  they  are  embedded  within  other  capabilities  of  timely  supply  and  low 
inventories that the environment demands.  
 
The paper also argues that the attribution of China’s remarkable export performance in 
textiles and apparel to its low unit costs and large scales of production is, in part, a misreading of 
the  China  story.    China’s  costs  are  low,  and  its  production  scales  enormous,  but  they  are 
embedded  within  crucial abilities that  lower the  “costs”  of  large  scales of  operation  (i.e.,  of 
rigidity) in the context of uncertain markets. China’s low cost producers are deeply embedded 
within  the  marketing,  distribution  and  supply  management  networks  of  locally  rooted  Hong 
Kong, Taiwanese and South Korean ‘triangle manufacturers’ who understand global markets well 
and have a long history of doing business with the most demanding of industrial markets, and 
who have mastered the capability to manage diversified production networks to deliver a wide 
range of quality products to its buyers in a timely way.  These factors make China much more 
than a mere low-cost producer apparel exporter. 
 
The end of quotas, and the ongoing churning in the global division of labor in apparel and 
textiles can be an opportunity for apparel producing firms in India with their severe handicap 
arising from labour policy induced rigidities, to chart an alternative growth path.  This paper 
provides a view of this alternative. 
 
Arvind Virmani 
Director & Chief Executive 
ICRIER 
 
November 2005   1 
Introduction 
 
The Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the system of bilateral quotas that has 
governed the global trade in textiles and apparel for the past forty years came to an end 
on January 1, 2005.  While the removal of global textile quotas has eliminated one of the 
most significant pieces of international trade protection in a half century (Levinsohn and 
Petropolous 2001),
1 it has simultaneously unleashed a fierce debate about the continued 
competitiveness of various supplier countries and their place in the international division 
of  labor  in  textiles  and  apparel.    Over  the  past  forty  years  the  system  of  quotas 
contributed  to  the  dispersal  of  the  apparel  industry  across  scores  of  countries.
2    For 
example, in 1992, nearly half  (49 percent) of all retail apparel sold in the United States 
was made in the US, but by 1999, just seven years later, the proportion of domestically 
produced retail apparel had fallen to 12 percent (Rabon 2001 cf. UNIDO Report 2003:7).  
By 2003, developing countries accounted for nearly three quarters of the export flows in 
apparel which constituted more that half (57%) of the $408 billion in global textile and 
apparel trade that year.  Many of these supplier countries today depend crucially on their 
apparel  export  sectors  for  foreign  exchange,  employment  and  national  income.  For 
example, clothing exports constitute 74%, 94% and 64% of total merchandise exports in 
Bangladesh, Lesotho
3 and El Salvador respectively (WTO 2001, US ITC 2004)
4  and the 
apparel and textile sectors are the largest industrial employers in each country.   
 
                                                 
1 Textiles and clothing is now fully integrated  into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) – as January 1. 2005, and on paper, only a system of national tariffs 
and a narrow set of safeguard measures restrict trade; subject to these constraints, suppliers are free to 
export as much product as they are able (Weil 2004, UNCTAD 2005). 
2 When textile and apparel quotas became binding in one country, buyers opened up production centers in 
new unconstrained sites where quotas were available, moving on to other locations once again when quotas 
there got exhausted. 
3 The rapid rise of apparel exports from Africa in the last four years is a result in large part of AGOA – the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act  – that the US signed with 37 African countries in 2000.  These 
countries are allowed tariff and quota free entry into the US clothing market in return for progress along 
several dimensions – a move toward market-based economies, rule of law, elimination of barriers to US 
trade and investment, protection of intellectual property, policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability 
of  health-care,  education  and  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  worker  rights  (www.agoa.com,  cf. 
Appelbaum et. al, 2005) 
4 US International Trade Commission, 2004, op cit,  Table 1-1, p. 1-4    2 
With  the  elimination  of  global  textile  quotas,  and  buyers  free  to  source  any 
amount of apparel from any country (subject only to a system of tariffs and safeguard 
measures), the geography of apparel production and trade is in tremendous flux (Gereffi 
2004,  Appelbaum  2005,  UNCTAD  2005,  USTIC  2004,  WTO  2004).    The  dominant 
assumption is that with the removal of quotas, large, low-wage countries in Asia (such as 
China and India), with their stable supply networks and large production capacities will 
benefit from the reorganization of global trade rules, while many smaller countries that 
had benefited from quota protection and assured market access under the MFA, will lose 
out.  Firms and policy makers point to the price deflation already experienced by apparel 
suppliers after the removal of quotas in January 2005, and to the growing consolidation 
among global buyers and retailers, as well as the early tide of withdrawal of foreign direct 
investment in textiles and apparel from many small countries (such as Mauritius, Lesotho 
and Madagascar among others) to argue that the end of quotas is already shaping winners 
and losers, and adjustment is likely to be complex, uncertain, and for many, painful, in 
the short-run.   
 
As  countries  search  for  ways  to  compete  in  this  volatile  environment,  a 
widespread assumption seems to be that with the removal of quotas, price, unit costs and 
volumes are likely to become even more critical determinants of global competitiveness 
for  apparel  and  textile  producers  than  previously.    Policy  makers  and  companies  are 
pointing to China’s explosive apparel export growth (of several hundred percent in some 
categories) in the months following the removal of quotas to conclude, or at least fear, 
that there are few alternatives to matching China’s massive volumes and low prices.   In 
many countries industry analysts are thus advising governments and firms to substantially 
ramp  up  their  capacities  and  scales  of  operation  and  relentlessly  lower  costs.    For 
example, in countries where labor laws are relatively ‘inflexible’ (in ways that inhibit 
scaling  up),  scholars,  industry  analysts  and  politicians  have  called  for  the  need  to 
dismantle several labor protections to allow local industry to scale up in order to compete 
with  China.    But,  is  scaling  up  and  cutting  costs  enough  to  compete  successfully  in 
today’s international markets?  Is that all that lies behind China’s export success?  This 
review  examines  a  growing  body  of  literature  that  links  international  trade  with  the   3 
institutional  organization  of  that  trade  and  production  to  argue  that  there  are  several 
additional  factors  –  beyond  the  traditional  factors  of  relative  prices,  exchange  rates, 
transportation costs, tariffs and customs costs
5 -- that are at play in shaping the structure 
of sourcing and supply in the apparel and textile industry today (Abernathy et. al. 1999, 
2004, Gereffi 1994, 1999, 2001, Gereffi et. al. 2004, Sabel 1994, Sabel and Reddy 2002, 
Piore 2002, Feenstra 1998, Dicken 1990, Schott 2004, Evans and Harrigan 2005, Tendler 
2001).  In portraying a different, more complex view of international sourcing, supply 
and competitiveness, this literature has important implications for policy as well as for 
our  understanding  of  the  conditions  under  which  suppliers  can  compete  and  grow  in 
today’s trade liberalized, post-quota world.   
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  The  next  section  briefly  describes  the 
institutional context within which textile and apparel trade took place over the last forty 
years. After a brief review of the MFA and ATC regimes, I briefly review what some of 
the  most  commonly  cited  quantitative  models  say  about  the  elimination  of  quotas.  
Section two examines the altered conditions of competition in product and international 
markets.  The next section examines three frameworks that have gained currency among 
scholars  in  recent  years  in  analyzing  how  firms  compete  in  today’s  volatile  markets. 
These  are:  the  flexible  production  networks  literature,  the  outsourcing  and  global 
commodity  chain  (or  global  value  chain)  literature,  and  the  ‘lean  retailing’  and 
specialization literature.  The fourth section explores the issue of upgrading, especially in 
Mexico  and  China.  It  looks  at  what  firms  are  actually  doing  and  how  the  various 
frameworks’ discussed in section three speak to this experience in terms of policy.  The 





   
                                                 
5  See Abernathy, Volpe and Weil (2004)   4 
Section 1:  What the standard literature says about the effect of the end of quotas on 
global apparel suppliers. 
 
The MFA, the ATC, and the back-loaded character of its dismantling 
 
The institutional context within which textile and apparel trade has taken place over the 
past forty years was characterized, till recently, by deep protectionism.  The Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA), and its successor, the Agreement of Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
which governed trade in textiles till it was abolished in January 2005, represented an 
elaborate system of protections (discriminatory bilateral quotas) that regulated the access 
of developing country apparel suppliers to key industrial markets in the US, EC, Canada, 
Norway and Australia.   The origins of the MFA lie in the Voluntary Export Restraint 
(VER) agreement that the United States negotiated with Japan in 1957 to control cotton 
textile imports into the US (Krishna and Tan 1998).  While the VER managed to curb 
cotton textile imports from Japan, many new exporters, such as Hong Kong, Portugal, 
Egypt and India, soon emerged on the scene (see Krishna and Tan 1998 for a detailed 
history).  In an attempt to apply VER-like restraints to a wider set of exporters, the US, 
along with the EC, turned to the multilateral GATT framework for global discussions on 
the import of cotton textile into their countries.  This led to a series of agreements – e.g., 
the Short Term Agreement on Cotton and Textiles in 1961, followed by the Long Term 
Agreement on Cotton and Textiles, all of which culminated in 1974 in a more general 
framework  of  import  restraints  governed  by  WTO  under  the  rules  of  the  Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA). The MFA defining framework governing the global trade in textiles 
and apparel for the next twenty years.    
 
The  MFA  gave  rise  to  a  costly  and  complicated  administrative  structure  –  in 
buyer and supplier countries – for allocating apparel and textile quotas to hundreds of 
suppliers in developing countries, for the production of hundreds of apparel categories 
that could be traded, and monitoring their use.
  As a large literature reports, the quota 
system generated extensive rent-seeking and distortions within exporting countries and 
between buyers and suppliers as quota recipients bid up quota rents, raising the cost of 
apparel  for  industrial  country  buyers  while  enriching  some  exporters  –  mainly  quota   5 
recipients  –  at  the  expense  of  others.
6      At  the same  time,  the  MFA  also  led  to  the 
dispersal of apparel assembly and production to scores of countries around the world. At 
its peak, seventy-three supplier countries participated in the textile quota system under 
the MFA, with different levels of quotas allocated to each (Krishna and Tan 1998).  An 
additional twenty-nine countries participated in voluntary capacity adhering to unilateral, 
non-MFA restraints (Abernathy et. al. 2004, OECD 2003).  Eventually, in 1995, member 
countries of the WTO agreed to transition away from the complexity of the quota system.  
The abolition of quotas was to occur over a ten year period under the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC).  After considerable uncertainty, and following a highly 
complicated transition process, all quotas were finally phased out on January 1, 2005.  
 
Ever since the Agreement in Textile and Clothing was signed in 1995, and leading up to 
the  dissolution  of  quotas,  much  has  been  written  about  the  anticipated  effects  of  the 
phase-out of the bilateral quota system on suppliers in various countries.   
 
First,  nearly  all  accounts  of  the  ATC  phase-out  highlight  the  back-loaded 
character of the implementation of the ATC. As Table 1 shows, nearly half (49 percent) 
of all constrained items became integrated only at the very end of the ten year transition 
period  of  the  quota  phase-out,  on  January  1,  2005.    In  some  product  categories  the  
amount  withheld  till  the  end  was  as  high  as  86  percent  (Chatterjee  2005,  see  also 
Abernathy et. al. 2004).  Most importing countries moreover were strategic in how they 
sequenced their integration into the ATC – taking care to liberalize their lowest value 
products first, such as yarn and textiles, and protecting till the end their most important 




                                                 
6  See: Trela and Whalley 1995, Krishna, Erzan and Tan 1994, Krishna and Tan 1998, Kathuria and 
Bhardwaj 1998, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr 1997 among others.   As some studies reported, exporting 
firms often had to share their quota rents with importers (Krishna, Erzan and Tan 1994).  Moreover the 
effect of quotas varied by country depending upon fill-rates and how constrained the country was.  Those 
who did not “fill” the allocated quotas enjoyed protection under the quota system in contrast to those who 
reached their quota limits quickly.   6 
Table 1:  The Back-Loaded Nature of the ATC Phase-Out Process 
           
     













Quotas*   
Phase I  Jan. 1 1995  16%  16%  16%   
Phase II  Jan 1 1998  17%  33%  25%   
Phase III  Jan 1 2001  18%  51%  27%   
Final Phase  Jan 1 2005  49%  100%  No Quotas   
* Growth relative to initial, pre-agreed rates (E.g., 3% - 3.5% in Phase I in 
Phase II, the growth rate would be a 25% increase in the 3.5% rate)   
Source: Word Trade Organization       
           
 
The back-loaded implementation of the ATC had two implications for importing 
and supplying countries.  For industrial countries the result of delayed adjustment was a 
sharper, more intense dislocation after the dismantling of protections;  and for supplier 
countries the main effect was price-pressure and uncertainty.   By saving till the end the 
integration  of  their  most  vital  product  categories,  industrial  countries  have  ended  up 
subjecting their apparel producers and workers to a harsher and more concentrated impact 
of the simultaneous loss of protections across a range of their most important product 
segments.
7  The ensuing dislocation – as witnessed already by the massive layoffs in the 
apparel sector in the US and EU – has led to escalated political tensions (between the US, 
EU and China for example), to vocal concerns in the popular press against cheap imports 
and the demand by apparel associations and manufacturing communities for the invoking 
of safeguard measures (against China, most notably) and the return to some degree of 
protection (see Appelbaum et. al. 2005).   
 
                                                 
7 With the real effects of liberalized trade not likely to be till 2005, Reinert (1993) estimates that the US 
will lose 16,100 jobs in the textiles sector and 21,300 full-time jobs in the clothing sectors post-MFA.  
Disaggregating households into eleven income categories, Hanson and Reinert (1997) further find that 
these job losses fall disproportionately on low-income workers.  Benefits to consumers from lower import 
prices (of apparel) do not off-set the difficulty of adjustment in  finding alternative employment.  The 
working families affected by lay-offs in the US textiles and apparel industry are thus expected to be worse 
off than they were before quotas were abolished (OECD 2003).  In genera;, post MFA adjustments are 
likely to be painful for many industrial country producers and communities, at least in the short run. 
   7 
For exporting (producing) countries, the major effect of a back-loaded integration 
process  under  the  ATC  has  been  its  impact  on  price.    The  sudden  freeing-up  of  a 
substantial number of constrained categories has put intense pressure on product prices, 
as suppliers compete for quota-free market share and as retailers demand –and obtain 
substantial price cuts now that quota-costs no longer apply.  Past evidence from earlier 
rounds of liberalization (in the second and third phases of the ATC) shows that prices fell 
by nearly 10-20 percent in key product categories within a year of their liberalization 
(Gereffi and Memdovic, 2004, Knappe 2003, Singhal et. al 2004).  In interviews in India 
just after the removal of quotas in 2005, many producers, especially (cut-make) contract 
manufacturers reported a significant fall in prices – 10-12% in their post-MFA sourcing 
cycle (Interviews in Bangalore, Tiruppur 2005).  Though not unforeseen, this squeeze on 
prices, in combination with trade tensions, the different levels of tariffs that still apply 
(differentially on different supplier countries) and unpredictable changes in the general 
system of preferences applied by different buyer countries to their various suppliers, has 
created tremendous uncertainty among suppliers, especially smaller sized suppliers about 
the  process  of  adjustment  and  the  anticipated  gains  and  losses  from  the  removal  of 
quotas. 
 
The standard predictions of studies on post-quota competitiveness
8 
 
Most  quantitative  studies  that  measure  the  projected  effects  of  quota  removal 
converge on the view that there will be global gains, in the aggregate, of quota removal 
for all countries taken together (ranging from $6 billion world-wide annually in some 
studies to $324 billion in others).
9  But these gains are likely to come from different 
sources for importing and supplying countries.  In industrial countries consumers gain 
from lower import prices,
10 and improved terms of trade (export to import price ratios), 
while textile and apparel producers and workers lose out – losing market share as well as 
                                                 
8 For a fuller review of the quantitative studies that model the effects of textile quota removal see: US ITC 
2004, OECD 20003 and Nordad (WTO) 2004. 
9 Most studies estimate that the removal of restrictions under the MFA will increase textile and apparel 
trade by anywhere from 5%  to 14% overall – with trade in apparel growing faster than trade in textiles (in 
some estimates twice as fast – Diao and Somwaru 2001).  
10 Cline 1987 (cf. OECD).   8 
manufacturing  jobs  to  lower  cost  developing  countries
  11    Conversely,  firms  in 
industrializing (exporting) countries are likely to gain from expanded market access,
12 a 
shift  toward  more  efficient  scales  and  system  of  production,
13  induced  technological 
change,
14 and the elimination of quota-related administrative costs.
15  But not all supplier 
countries are estimated to gain equally.  Most studies project that “efficient producers,” 
such as China, South Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia would likely break into 
formerly restricted US and EU markets more easily than higher cost producers in Latin 
America,  Middle  East,  North  Africa,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  CIS  countries, 
gaining market share at the expense of the latter (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr 1997).  
Nearly all studies predict that China will be the major beneficiary of the liberalization of 
quotas – some estimating an astonishing increase in apparel production of 249% after 
quota  removal  and  China’s  WTO  accession,  and  a  330%  increase  in  exports 
(Ianchovichina, Martin and Fukase 2000 cf.. OECD 2003). 
 
   The standard estimates of  the projected gains and losses from quota removal are 
generally  based  on  models  that  look  at  mainly  three  metrics  of  competitiveness  (i) 
Relative  prices,  (ii)  cost-competitiveness  (based  on  cost  functions  that  decompose 
production costs into broad components – capital, materials, labor, energy); (iii) and the 
relative level of a country's pre-abolition quota restrictiveness (i.e. the relative difference 
between  quota  caps  and  the  supplier  country's  estimated  comparative  advantage  in 
textiles).
16  These  variables  are  moreover  measured  using  base-line  data  for  particular 
years – 1993, 1996, 1998, with the assumption that trade patterns that prevailed during 
these years continue to prevail in subsequent years—a problematic assumption in itself, 
                                                 
11 Yang, Martin and Yanagishima 1997 (cf. OECD 2003). 
12 Nearly all studies predict this outcome for developing countries as a whole, though individual countries 
fare quite differently. 
13 Trela and Whalley 1995 (cf. OECD). 
14 Bagch 1994 (cf. OECD). 
15 Krishna and Tan 1998, Diao and Somawaru 2001, Kathhuria and Bhardwaj 1998 (OCED 2003). 
16 The degree of restrictiveness of a quota is usually measured in terms of (1) the cost of acquiring and 
deploying a quota or its ‘export tax equivalent’ (ETE) (USITC 2004, Kathuria, Martin and Bhardwaj 2001, 
Krishna and Tan (1998), and (2) the degree to which the quota was ‘binding’ for a country’s exports.  The 
‘binding-ness’ of a quota is measured by the degree of ‘fill’ of a quota or its utilization rate (i.e., ratio of a 
country’s actual exports in an item to its total quota allocation in that item).   The more restrictive the 
quota, the higher its cost or ‘export tax.’  The more binding the quota (i.e., the higher its utilization rate), 
the greater the degree of restrictiveness of the country’s quota exports, and hence the greater its predicted 
post-quota export bounce.   9 
as we see below.  Based on these measures, the assumption is that the lower a country's 
factor  costs  (given  its  endowments);  and  the  greater  its  cost  efficiency  relative  to  its 
comparators, and the greater its pre-abolition restrictiveness of quotas, the greater will be 
its post-2005 boom in apparel exports.
17  The familiar predictions thus follow: major 
gains  in  apparel  export  shares  for  China,  to  a  smaller  extent  India,  Indonesia  and 




The most widely cited study in this regard (and amongst the most careful) is by 
Nordås of the WTO (2004) which estimates that China will gain 50 percent of the US 
market share in apparel after MFA, up more than 212 percent from its current share of 16 
percent.  India would increase its market share in the US five-fold from the current 3 
percent to 15 percent after MFA.  Similarly, China would gain 29 percent of the EU 
market after the removal of quotas (up from the current 18 percent), and India would 
improve its share in the EU from the current 6 percent to 9 percent post-MFA.  Nordås’ 
model  also  predicts  marginal  gains  for  Bangladesh  in  the  EU,  but  predicts  losses  of 
market share in the US and EU of several of their traditional, more proximate suppliers – 
such as Turkey and Central and Eastern Europe for the EU; and Mexico, Central America 









                                                 
17 I.e., one would expect countries like China and India which were the most quota-restrained suppliers to 
gain market share, say in the US relative to non-quota countries like Mexico etc whose biggest gains had 
already occurred pre-quota abolition and post-integration via NAFTA.   In the long run prices and cost-
efficiency drive market share in this view. 
18 As some have pointed out, the relatively slow growth of non-quota countries such as Latin America and 
Africa post-MFA is in part a correction of their earlier spurt in growth after the signing of quota-free 
regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and AGOA (E.g., Virmani).   10 
Table 2:  Projected Impact of Quota Removal on the EU and US Apparel Markets – Changing 
Market Share 
Changing market share of key supplier countries in the US and EU markets 
(Percent)             
 EU         US       
  Before   After ATC        Before  After ATC 
China  18  29     China  16  50 
India  6  9    India  4  15 
Turkey  9  6    Hong Kong  9  6 
Central and Eastern Europe  9  6    Rest of the Americas  16  5 
Hong Kong  6  6    Mexico  10  3 
Other north Africa  6  5    Thailand    3 
Morocco  5  4    Philippines  4  2 
Poland  5  4    Indonesia  4  2 
Bangladesh  3  4    Bangladesh  4  2 
Indonesia  3  3    Sri Lanka    2 
Rest of the World  30  24    Rest of the World  24  10 
        European Union   5   
            Chinese Taipei  4    
Source: Nordås 2004 (WTO)             
 
 
Based strictly on the logic of these (aggregate) models it would appear, as one 
analyst noted that “with the phasing out of quotas one of the most important determinant 
of  exports  [is]  the  cost  competitiveness  of  the  exporting  country.”
19    Indeed,  several 
recent studies have made precisely this argument calling for cost-reductions as a critical 
prerequisite  for  competing  with  more  efficient  apparel  and  textile  producers  such  as 
China.      In  the  Indian  context,  for  example,  the  Gherzi  Report  (2003)  argued  that 
reducing the cost of inputs, energy, dyes, and chemicals – apart from the cost of wages, 
capital and technology – would be critical for India to take advantage of the elimination 
of  quotas.    Similarly,  in  a  recent  study  Hashim  (2005)  undertook  a  detailed 
deconstruction of the cost-composition of Indian textile and garment exports, and of the 
sources of productivity in these sectors on a similar assumption that reducing unit costs, 
increasing  the  scale  of  production,  and  improving  productivity  are  necessary  and 
sufficient conditions for countries like India to remain competitive post-MFA.  Using 
more aggregate models Elbehri, Hertel and Martin (2003) similarly argued that if the 
labor  productivity  of  Indian  textiles  and  apparel  industries  could  be  increased  by  67 
                                                 
19 Cited by an anonymous reviewer, 2005.   11 
percent to match China’s, then the benefits to India of quota elimination would more than 
double (cf. OECD 2003).  
 
However, while cost reductions in all the ways that Gherzi (2003), Hashim (2005) 
point out are important, and although the models on which these as well as other cross-
country projections of post-quota gains and losses are based have captured wide popular 
attention, they tell only a partial story.  As the authors of the models themselves point out 
(Nordås 2004, OECD 2003, USITC 2004), they do not capture some of the fundamental 
ways in which the structure of apparel production, sourcing and trade have changed in 
recent years.  They leave out of the analysis, for example, the powerful role that global 
retailers play today in shaping the geography of apparel production through their sourcing 
decisions and the organization of complex global clothing chains that span the globe; nor 
do they capture the growing importance of timeliness in apparel sourcing and supply, of  
flexibility, product diversity, inventory risk and the demand for rapid replenishment and 
other characteristics of lean retailing (see Abernathy et. al 1999, 2004), or the tremendous 
variation within countries, regions, production networks and supply chains. As Nordås 
(2004:5) puts it, these changes in the sourcing and trade of apparel have shifted “the 
question of competitiveness from mainly a question of production costs, to becoming a 
question of costs in combination with lead time, flexibility,” and other factors such as 
quality, consistency, quick turnaround times and timely delivery privileged by the ‘new 
competition’ (Best, 1990).  
     
Moreover, as numerous disaggregated (qualitative as well as quantitative) studies 
of firms, plants and regions within countries have shown, it is misleading to base policy 
advice solely on aggregate industry or country level trends since they mask important 
dynamics that are playing out at the local level.  For example, in a classic study of the US 
textile and apparel industry Levinsohn and Petropolous (2001) show that while aggregate 
industry level data shows that the US  textile and apparel industry is in secular decline 
(and  has  been  for  the  past  half  century),  plant-level  analysis  shows  a  very  different 
picture.  It shows how firms are both entering as well as leaving this industry, that there is 
considerable technical change and innovation at the plant level, that even as jobs are   12 
being  lost,  many  good,  well-paying  jobs  are  being  simultaneously  created.    In  other 
words, there is evidence of ‘creative destruction’ in this mature industry, and not just 
destruction or plain secular decline (Levinsohn and Petropolous 2001).  The implications 
of this kind of analysis for policy is that it gives policy makers concrete clues about what 
to do:  rather than merely viewing the textile industry as a dying, sunset industry that 
high-wage  regions  should  transition  away  from,  policy  makers  can  help  deepen  the 
‘creative’ part of the process of change by helping the industry as it transforms into a 
more flexible, innovative, higher tech, better paying, albeit leaner sector.
20  In the US, the 
government has contributed to such efforts by encouraging, for example, innovation and 
R&D  in  the  textile  and  apparel  sector.    The  American  Textile  Partnership  –  a 
collaborative  R&D  initiative  between  industry,  professional  associations  and  the 
government’s national laboratories under the Department of Energy is an example of 
such an effort (Berger et. al. 1997).  A byproduct of this collaboration is the National 
Sourcing Database, an extensive base of marketing, design and production information 
that US apparel and textile firms have used heavily to supply as well as source apparel 
since in the last decade (Berger, Karty and Gartner 1997). 
 
Second, as is already well known, many of the assumptions that the cross-country 
models are based on do not – or need not – hold.  For example, most studies assume that 
trade  patterns  which  prevailed  when  the  studies  were  conducted  would  continue  to 
prevail  after  quotas  are  removed.    This  need  not  be  the  case.    As  we  are  already 
witnessing, the initial patterns of trade after the phase out of the MFA have brought some 
surprises.  Most studies had predicted a sharp fall in apparel exports from small countries, 
such as Bangladesh, Cambodia and non-quota countries like Peru and Colombia, as they 
lost market share to lower cost China, but the opposite has been true.  After a brief fall in 
the year to date growth rates, exports have grown from all these countries.   
 
 
                                                 
20 Similarly, as Berger, Gartner and Karty show, even as late as in the 1990s, the US textile industry ranked 
among the top four industries in the country in terms of employment (employing 12% of the workforce in 
1992), sales, productivity increases in recent years and in contribution to manufacturing GDP (Berger and 
Lester 1997:140).   13 
Figure 1:  Post-MFA Year-to-Date Growth Rate of Apparel Exports to the US from 35 Top Supplier 
Countries (Percent Change in Exports):  January-August 2005 over January-August 2004 





























































































































































































































































































































Source: Calculations are based on data from USITC, 2005 
 
The  elimination  of  quotas  does  not  mean,  then,  that  export  shares  of  supplier 
countries  or  firms  will  now  be  determined  largely  through  a  play  of  market  forces.  
Indeed, the continued importance of tariffs and preferential trade agreements – and their 
use as policy levers by buyer countries to reward or exclude supplier countries in the 
absence  of  quotas  –  illustrates  quite  well  how  the  elimination  of  quotas  does  not 
automatically  translate  into  unfettered  market  access  for  cost-competitive  suppliers.  
Abernathy et. al. (2004) show, for example, how Bangladesh dominates the European 
market for T-shirts, but not the US market.  Despite the same average cost of production 
Bangladeshi T-shirts fare differently in these two markets because of differential tariff 
levels, Abernathy et. al argue because of differential tariff levels.  Based on its Lead 
Developed Country status, Bangladesh enjoys tariff-free entry into the EU for all apparel 
that undergoes two stages of production within the country (e.g, knitting and sewing), but 
this is not the case in the US.  The US, instead gives tariff-free entry to Mexico, the   14 
Caribbean basin countries, Central America and a set of thirty seven African nations 
under AGOA with whom it has preferential trade agreements.  
 
The  rise  of  regional  trade  agreements  (RTAs),  such  as  NAFTA,  CAFTA  and 
AGOA similarly segments market access and create stickiness in trade by giving member 
countries preferential and duty-free access (based on rules of origin) to major markets in 
the US and EU, thus privileging them over others. To the extent that differential tariff 
levels become even more important after the end of quotas, participation in RTAs could 
off-set  some  of  the  losses  that  non-quota  countries  might  have  experienced  vis-à-vis 
quota  constrained  Asian  countries  after  the  removal  of  quotas.    Similarly,  the  re-
imposition of quotas and safeguard measures on China by the US and EU are further 
illustrations  of  how  government  policies  and  regulations  (including  international 
standards, codes of conduct, legal rights and domestic rules) continue to shape production 
and export outcomes in textiles and apparel world-wide, despite the removal of ATC 
regulations. 
 
As a growing body of work has pointed out, fundamental changes in the nature of 
demand and of product markets, both of which have become more unstable, fragmented 
and  volatile  in  the  last  two  decades,  have  forced  firms  to  deal  with  ever  shortening 
product cycles and continuous demands for flexibility, quality and timeliness—over and 
above, price. Similarly dramatic changes in technology, the rise of outsourcing, and the 
diffusion of new kinds of work-practices such as flexible production, lean manufacturing 
and lean retailing have altered buyer-supplier relations and transformed the production 
networks and global supply chains within which industrial work, especially in footloose 
sectors such as textiles and apparel is organized—both locally and off-shore.  All of these 
factors complicate adjustment and upgrading among producers as they try to deal with 
intensified  competition  in  the  global  market  for  textiles  and  apparel.    Thus,  cost 
competitiveness while important, is only one component of any firm or region’s attempt 
to improve its position in the global market place post-MFA. Equally critical is for firms 
and for policy-makers to take account of the ways in which numerous organizational 
forces  are  altering  the  structure  of  sourcing  and  supply  today  –  over  and  above   15 
considerations of relative prices.  It is to a review of these forces, and the literature that 
studies them, that we turn next. 
 
Section 2:  The Changed Conditions of Competition  
 
It is by now widely accepted that the system of ‘fordist’ mass production that 
prevailed as the dominant form of industrial organization throughout the post-war period 
has  broken  down.    In  this  system,  which  relied  on  stable  demand  for  relatively 
standardized goods, long product cycles, and a detailed division of labor that facilitated 
the development of highly specialized technology embodied in dedicated equipment and 
progressive  automation,  static  and  dynamic  scale  economies  were  achieved  through 
vertical integration and high volume production.  Sophisticated management techniques 
(and  demand  growth)  ensured  high  rates  of  capacity  utilization  that  helped  improve 
throughput,  fuel  productivity  growth  and  lower  unit  costs.    These  cumulative  gains 
fuelled a virtuous cycle of productivity-led growth. (Chandler 1977,  Piore and Sabel 
1984, Appelbaum and Batt 1994).  Starting in the mid-1970s, the large stable markets 
that mass-production was predicated on began to break down.   
 
The  crisis  of  mass  production  was  triggered  by  the  convergence  of  three 
subsidiary crises in the 1979s: (1) the crisis of markets (and demand), (2) the crisis of 
competition, and (3) technical change (Piore and Sabel 1984, Feenstra 1998).   
 
Triggered by the oil crises of the 1970s, with sharply rising energy prices and 
uncertainty  about  prices  and  availability  of  inputs,  markets  became  characterized  by 
tremendous  flux  and  uncertainty  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  –  an  uncertainty  that  went 
beyond, and lasted well beyond the standard business cycle.  This uncertainty in supply 
was  compounded  by  fluctuation  in  the  composition  of  demand,  initially  triggered  by 
recessionary conditions of the 1970s and 1980s, but later by changes in consumer tastes 
as a growing middle class demanded product variety and good quality in addition to low 
price.   Shifts in the international exchange rate mechanism – the switch from fixed to 
floating exchange rates in the 1970s – the debt crisis in developing countries, structural   16 
adjustment  and  tight  fiscal  policies  further  heightened  competition  and  uncertainty, 
leading to rising interest rates, volatility of demand, and high production costs.  Thus, in 
both developed and developing countries, the crisis of supply, turned into a crisis of 
demand leading to a growing malaise of the large, rigid, integrated enterprises that found 
it difficult to respond quickly to the prevailing uncertainty, volatility and fragmentation 
of demand, and their own growing  excess capacity (Piore and Sabel 1984).   
 
Meanwhile, the rise of Japan and the Newly Industrializing Countries of East Asia 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) as major exporters and global players 
in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a further intensification of competition worldwide. The 
strong  promotion  of  export  oriented  industrialization  in  the  late  1980s  and  1990s  by 
multilateral lending organizations (following structural adjustment policies) and national 
governments, as well as the integration of the former Soviet bloc and China into the 
global market, meant that a growing number of exporters were competing for the same 
products (labor-intensive, as well as low-and mid-tech goods and services) in the same, 
increasingly fragmented markets.   Growing consumer demand for product variety, and 
the pressure on producers to differentiate their products and/or introduce new ones to 
capture market share, led to the dramatic shortening of product cycles since the 1980s 
(Piore and Sabel 1984, Best 1990).  For example, there used to be two to four buying 
seasons in the international apparel industry, today there are six to eight if not more.  
New automotive models were introduced once every few years – today new models are 
introduced annually. 
 
Simultaneously,  rapid  technical  change,  particularly  the  development  of 
microprocessor-based  technologies,  aided  customization  and  lowered  the  cost  of 
obtaining diversity and product variety.  This allowed small-batch producers to compete 
with mass producers in fragmented markets, thus undercutting the cost advantage of scale 
economies in vertically integrated corporations.  Just as outsourcing and a growing export 
orientation globally had intensified competition in low-priced markets, the diffusion of 
microelectronic  technologies  worldwide  lowered  the  cost  of  flexible  production  and   17 
increased competition in quality-conscious markets as well (Appelbaum and Batt 1994, 
Piore and Sabel 1984, Feenstra 1998).   
 
In this volatile environment, firms must now compete on the basis of quality, 
flexibility, product variety, quick turnaround times, timely deliveries and low cost.  For 
example, the most competitive firms are not only cost-efficient, but also flexible. They 
have the capacity to produce a wide range of products and switch their production lines 
rapidly from one to the other, while holding down ever decreasing inventory levels.  A 
Hong  Kong  sweater  company  with  200  workers  for  instance,  can  work  on  twenty 
different styles at the same time, some with orders as small as 150-300 pieces; another 
Chinese denim manufacturer went from producing 3-4 items to over 300 different items, 
and reduced its lead time from 45 days to 30 days; another Hong Kong company can 
produce 70 different kinds of yarns a month (Berger, Gartner and Karty 1997); an Indian 
silk furnishings manufacturer has a repertoire of 2000 designs that it can draw on at any 
time to produce batches as small as 50-150 meters, even while its profit margins reach 
nearly 40 percent (Tewari 2005). 
 
These changes and the new demands they make on firms have scrambled the old 
logic  of  stable  demand,  large  volumes,  throughput  and  low  unit  costs  in  vertically 
integrated  hierarchical  firms  –  pushing  corporations  to  search  for  innovative  ways  of 
coping  with  the  growing  uncertainty  of  demand  and  the  requirements  of  the  new 
competition.  The alternatives that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to old-style mass 
production came to be divided into two (stylized) categories – ‘high road’ approaches 
based  on  flexibility,  understanding  of  different  markets,  innovation  and  new  ways  of 
sharing and defraying risk, versus ‘low road’ strategies based on low wages as the prime 
source of advantage.      
 
The ‘low road’ was associated with competition on the basis of cost.  Its focus on 
cutting costs put pressure on wages, contractual relationships, overheads, and scale (Piore 
2002).  This road generally fetched very low margins.  Low margins pushed companies 
toward building up revenue with volumes.  Labor saving automation, coupled with long   18 
runs  of  relatively  simple  goods  provided  some  profits,  but  the  approach  involved  no 
fundamental changes in the organization of work or in management practices (see Piore 
2002, Piore and Sabel 1984, Humphrey and Schmitz 2000, 2002, Schmitz and Knorringa 
(2000), Tendler 2001, 2003).  Low-road strategies often contributed to a ‘race to the 
bottom,’  especially  in  highly  footloose  industries  such  as  textiles  and  apparel,  where 
retailers and buyers sought to pass off more and more tasks down the chain to their 
suppliers and rising outsourcing shifted production to sites with lower and lower wages 
and factor costs around the globe. 
 
The second strategy, of following the ‘high road,’ was to upgrade – move up-
market to higher value phases of the production process, to higher value goods, improved 
products, and processes.  This approach involved competing on the basis of improved 
quality, product differentiation, the ability to produce a wide array of product variety and 
respond more rapidly and flexibly to changing market conditions and to the volatility that 
characterized demand (Piore 2002, Tendler 2001a, 2001b, Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).  
In  many  cases  these  work  systems  involved  a  fundamental  restructuring  of  the  work 
organization and the adoption of innovative work practices diffused from the Japanese 
system  of  just-in-time  inventories,  quality  circles  and  continuous  improvement.    The 
actual organization of work and inter-firm relations in the high road approach have taken 
many different forms and are called by different names – lean manufacturing (Dertouzos, 
Lester and Solow 1988, Cole1980), flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel 1984, Brusco 
1982), high performance work systems (Appelbaum and Batt 1994) and so on.   In reality 
elements of the so called ‘low road’ were often mixed in with ‘high’ road practices.  E.g., 
the  same  firm  may  have  some  low  road  operations  (and  plants)  and  some  high  road 
practices, or the same firm that operated as low road at one point in time may operate 
with higher performance work practices at another time. (We will return to these new 
organizational forms momentarily). 
 
In the textile and apparel sector the earliest shifts were associated with a search 
for lower costs.  This manifested in three ways throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s:  
(1) Extensive outsourcing (of apparel assembly) first locally, and then to suppliers in   19 
lower  wage  sites  across  the  world,  and  (2)  the  rising  power  of  large  retailers  and 
corporate buyers based in industrial countries (such as Gap, Nike, Walmart) who played a 
key role in organizing and coordinating these emerging global networks and clothing 
supply chains.  (3) In the 1990s the rise of information technologies and the deepening 
power of retailers demanding timely supplies of apparel led to the rise of “lean retailing,” 
or production relations associated with rapid replenishment of fast-moving stocks.  
 
In  response  to  changed  market  conditions  and  the  demands  for  flexibility 
described above, an extensive vertical disintegration or corporate restructuring followed.  
Throughout  the  1980s  and  1990s,  firms  externalized  many  relations,  functions  and 
operations that had been internal to the firm previously.  Many large producers shut down 
parts of their in-house production and began to source increasing amounts of the total 
value of their products from subcontractors outside the firm—initially locally and then 
off-shore  (Herrigel  2004).    Firms  sought  to  reduce  inventories,  shift  from  dedicated 
equipment to flexible productive arrangements and build strategic alliances with their 
suppliers and other firms to lower costs as well as to insure against the risk of supplying 
increasingly varied products to volatile markets.  Subcontracting relations proliferated. 
Indeed, in the 1980s new kinds of branded apparel merchandisers arose (such as  Liz 
Claiborne and Nike) who owned no factories.  These branded “manufacturers without 
factories” such as Liz Claiborne, Nike, Reebok, controlled only marketing, branding and 
product design—the highest value functions in the production of apparel—and sourced 
their entire stock from suppliers across the globe (Gereffi 1994, 1999, Appelbaum and 
Gereffi1994).   
 
A  large  literature  emerged  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  to  analyze  this  growing 
externalization  of  contracts  and  the  rise  of  networked  forms  of  production.    Many 
scholars  looked  at  these  complex  inter-firm  relations  through  the  lens  of  transactions 
costs, asset specificity, implicit contracts, and ‘bundles’ of property rights associated with 
the shifting boundaries of the de-verticalized firm (Williamson 1975, 1985, Alchian and 
Demsetz  1972,  Hart  1989,  Hart  and  Holmstrom  1987,  Ben-Porath  1980,  Kreps  and 
Wilson 1984). Using notions of incomplete contracts and asymmetric information (in the   20 
face of uncertainty), they examined how problems of asset-specificity, “lock-ins,” or ex-
post monopoly power generate different kinds of inter-firm or buyer-supplier relations 
over time (Hart and Moore 1988, Pfeffer and Baron 1988).  In the cases were the ties are 
the most hierarchical, small suppliers remain locked into generally exploitative relations 
with large buyers, while in other cases where efforts linked to the building of trust in the 
face of uncertainty helped build more relational and mutually dependent ties, buyers and 
suppliers  gained  flexibility  through  strategic  specialization  and  repeated,  long-term 
contracts (Johansson and Mattsson 1987, Granovetter 1985, Miles and Snow, Sabel 1989, 
Piore and Sabel 1984, Feenstra 1998.)
21 
 
The literature on the textile and clothing industry identifies three broad kinds of 
subcontracting patterns in apparel ranging loosely along the continuum of ’low to ‘high’ 
road work practices.  The most common kind of subcontracting centered around export-
oriented  apparel  assembly,  where  firms,  often  in  low-cost  settings  performed  simple 
operations – such as cutting and sewing of inputs (raw material and accessories) provided 
by the buyer (such as JC Penny, Sears), and using designs and patterns provided by the 
buyer.    The  Mexican  Maquiladoras
22  were  a  classic  example  of  this  kind  of 
subcontracting, as were, to varying degrees, the hundreds of small and medium producers 
in immigrant communities in cities like New York, Florida and Los Angeles to producers 
across  developing  countries.    In  these  kinds  of  subcontracting  ties  suppliers  add  the 
lowest value in the supply chain and cost-reduction is a general and consistent pressure 
(Herrigel 2004, Gereffi 1999). 
 
The second pattern of supply is the so called original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM) model where suppliers take on many more responsibilities than merely cutting 
and sewing pre-designed products using inputs provided by the buyer.  OEM suppliers 
marshal a wider range of capabilities – providing design inputs, developing prototypes, 
working with the buyer to source inputs and accessories, package and finish the product, 
and  in  so  doing  learn  about  and  obtain  control  over  a  wider  range  of  upstream  and 
                                                 
21 See Pfeffer and Baron (1988) for an excellent review of the first generation of this literature 
22  Maquiladoras  were  a  Mexican  organizational  form  where  firms  located  in  Mexico  processes  or 
assembled good for US buyers using inputs, parts, and specifications provided by the buyer.   21 
downstream  (backward  and  forward)  linkages  in  the  process  of  clothing  production 
(Gereffi 1999, Gereffi et. al. 2004). Some have called OEM production “full-package” 
supply (Gereffi 1994, 1999, 2004), where supplier are not only able to capture a greater 
share of the total value added to the final goods they produce, but have longer-term, more 
relational ties with their  buyers.  Many East Asian firms in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and now China, fit these traits.  In reality of course, the boundaries between these 
different forms of work organization – such as assembly operations and OEM supply – 
are often blurred.  A firm may be both at the same time: it may be a barebones cut-make-
trim (CMT) operator for some buyers (such as Nike) but a full-package, OEM supplier 
for others (JC Penny, Dillards) (see Smith et. al. 2002, Pickles et. al. 2004). 
 
A  third  form  of  work  organization  focuses  on  inter-firm  relations  that  do  not 
dichotomize between large versus small firms but focuses on the conditions under which 
firms of various sizes -- buyers and suppliers – are able to build collaborative ties and 
develop the capacity for ongoing adjustment to volatile and uncertain markets.   Drawing 
on the striking success of Italian producers in the textile and garment districts of Prato 
and  Emilia  Romana,  in  coping  remarkably  flexibly  with  the  fragmented  markets  and 
turbulent  environment  of  the  1980s  and  1990s,  the  ‘flexible  specialization’  literature 
describes innovative and highly flexible production networks of horizontally linked firms 
that  have  jointly  found  ways  to  lower  the  cost  and  risk  of  dealing  with  uncertainty 
(Brusco 1982, Piore and Sabel 1984, Sabel 1989).  This literature arose in response to the 
puzzle of growing productivity and innovation among small and medium firms in the 
Third Italy and parts of Germany in the absence of firm-level economies of scale and in 
the face of the same pressures that were creating dislocation in large companies.  Loosely 
akin to Marshalian industrial districts with powerful external economies at the regional 
level, this form of industrial organization is associated with dense networks of spatially 
concentrated,  sectorally  specialized  firms
23  with  strong,  yet  flexible,  ties  of  trust  and 
mutual dependence and supported by institutions at the local and regional level. Firms 
within these production networks use sophisticated technologies such as microelectronics 
                                                 
23  Industrial districts are often associated with networks of small and medium firms,  but firm size is not a 
defining characteristic of a flexibly specialized network – firms of any size with decentralized corporate 
structures can be, and are, a part of such networks.   22 
and  information  technologies  that  enhance  the  cost-competitiveness  of  small  batch 
production, and allow firms to produce a wide variety of high quality goods that could be 
rapidly modified in response to changing market demands.  These firms use a broadly 
skilled labor force and collaborative inter-firm relationships to achieve efficiency through 
inter-firm  specialization  and  flexibility  through  a  combination  of  competition  and 
collaboration.  The spatial and sectoral concentration of flexible  production networks 
enables municipal and local governments to provide collective infrastructure (such as 
R&D and testing centers), public goods and services to the network as a whole at low 
cost, thus allowing even smaller firms to access quality services and technologies that 
they could not individually afford.  The presence of active inter-firm institutions (such as 
producers associations), skilled workers and long term inter-firm collaborations allows 
the flexibly specialized production networks to achieve economies of scale and scope at 
the level of the network as a whole.  Firms in flexible production networks, thus, compete 
on  the  basis  of  their  ability  to  respond  quickly  to  fluctuations  in  the  market  and  to 
customer demand for variety and good quality, rather than by driving down labor costs.  
Instead  of  putting  pressure  on  labor  costs,  the  focus  is  on  lowering  indirect  costs, 
lowering the costs of innovation through collaboration, reducing product development 
times, reducing lead times and overcoming the problems of rigidity and excess capacity 
that plague larger firms with dedicated equipment in turbulent environments (Piore and 
Sabel 1984, Appelbaum and Batt 1994).    
 
The following table presents a stylized comparison of the various organizational forms 
discussed above – Market, Hierarchy, Relational Networks (Flexible Specialization) and 







   23 
Table 3:  Comparison of Organizational Forms 
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In the apparel sector outsourcing was closely tied to the off-shoring of work and 
to the internationalization of production. As Table 3 shows, imported intermediate inputs 
into the textile and apparel sectors of the US and several countries in Europe increased 
dramatically between the late 1970s and 1980s.  Technical change and deep reductions in 
transportation  costs  reinforced  this  global  dispersion  of  production,  allowing  firms  to 
“slice their value chain” and take it to sites where they had access to the resources, know-
how and factors that they needed at the lowest possible costs – a process of centralized 
control over the chain, combined with global dispersal of production that many have 
called ‘vertical specialization’  (Krugman cf. Feenstra 1998).   
 
Table 4:  Out-sourcing and Off-shoring of Labor-Intensive Work – Late 1970s to 1980s 
 
Ratio of Imported to Domestic Intermediate inputs - Textiles,  
Apparel and Footwear (Percent).     
Country 
Early 
1970s  Late 1970s  Mid-1980s    
              
Canada   41  50  60   
France  15  26  42   
Germany  na  49  64   
Japan  3  6  9   
UK   19  33  48   
USA  7  6  13    
Source: Audet, 1966 cf. Feenstra 1998 p. 39.   
 
 
The first round of outsourcing began in the early 1970s when US and EU buyers 
increasingly  began  outsourcing  apparel  assembly  to  East  Asian  firms
24  –  in  Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1970s, and then to firms across Latin 
America, South Africa, other parts of Asia and especially to China in the 1980s and 
beyond.  This outsourcing was driven by several factors, as we have noted – the high 
costs  of  operating  vertically  integrated  systems  in  the  face  of  volatile  and  unstable 
markets,  and  the  ‘retail  wars’  especially  in  the  US  in  the  1980s  between  traditional 
supermarkets and newer retail formats such as direct purchase, mail-orders distributors, 
                                                 
24 Japan was the earliest exporter of textiles and apparel to Western buyers in the 1950s and 1960s.    25 
hyper-markets, specialty stores and private labels at mass merchandise department stores 
that were all competing for the same consumer markets and sought to procure more and 
more varieties of apparel at lower and lower prices and in shorter and shorter turnaround 
times (see Gereffi 1999, Appelbaum 2005, and Lichtenstein 2005).   
 
The rapid spread of apparel production to industrializing countries between the 
1970s and 1990s was not only the result of market forces and changed market conditions; 
it was also actively shaped and reinforced by policies in developed and developing (buyer 
and  supplier)  countries.    For  example,  the  MFA  helped  shape  the  spread  of  apparel 
production  and  exports  to  quota  countries  across  industrializing  countries.    Within 
developing  countries these trends were  accompanied by the rise of  export processing 
zones, the investment by governments in industrial parks and special economic zones 
geared toward attracting export-oriented FDI, and procedures that made it easier for firms 
to export and repatriate profits.  In industrial countries the trends were accompanied – 
and aided -- by the crafting of special legislation that encouraged outward processing 
trade (OPT) or ‘production-sharing’ – such as the ‘807’ rule in the US that waived the 
double taxation of US goods (textiles and apparel and consumer electronics) re-imported 
into the US after assembly operations in Mexican Maquiladoras, or by tax and tariff 
concessions awarded to contract manufacturers on Europe’s Mediterranean rim, Turkey 
or post-socialist Eastern Europe who assemble apparel for European retailers and buyers 
under Europe’s Outward Processing Trade rules (see Taplin 1994 and Gereffi 1999 for 
evidence from the US, and  Smith et. al 2004 for evidence from Europe).   
 
Section 3: The Off-shoring of Production and the Global Value Chain Framework 
 
As global outsourcing has intensified, several frameworks have emerged to make 
sense of the growing integration of global production networks.  The global value chain 
framework has emerged in recent years as an increasingly popular conceptual framework 
for  studying  the  evolution  of  export-based  industries  and  incorporating  analyses  of 
globalization into development studies (Bair 2005, Gereffi 1994).  This literature, rooted 
in World Systems theory (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986, 1994) and later extended by   26 
Gereffi and colleagues (Gereffi 1994, 1999, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994, Appelbaum 
and Gereffi 1994, Bair and Gereffi 2002, Gereffi, and  Kaplinsky 2001, Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2002,  Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005)  analyzes how specific industrial 
sectors and production systems change as they become globalized, and uses the ‘global 
value chain’ (or commodity chain) as the unit of analysis – as opposed to the firm, sector, 
or  region.    A  global  value  chain  is  defined  as  a  “network  of  labor  and  production 
processes whose end result is a finished commodity.”
25 In contrast to Porter’s (1990) use 
of the value chain, the global value chain framework is not firm-driven.  Its focus is on 
how  various  functions  of  a  product’s  (or  industry’s)  supply  chain  are  splintered  and 
globally dispersed. Given that the concept originated in a series of analyses carried out in 
the 1980s and 1990s of historical and contemporary trade, global capital flows, and the 
differential outcomes of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
26 the GVC framework focuses 
specifically  on  the  global  linkages  of  the  various  bundles  of  economic  activity  or 
processes – from design to product development, to production, to branding, marketing 
and distribution -- that are part of an industry’s supply chain, and which are involved in 
producing and bringing a final product to market.    
 
The framework seeks to understand both the organizational dynamics of global 
economic activity—the vertical linkages between firms at different nodes of the chain— 
as well as its development outcomes (Bair 2005).  The organizational dynamics of the 
global supply chain, in this view, clarify not only the (uneven) developmental outcomes 
of global production processes, but provide a method to study the place of a country (and 
its industries) in the international economy and its prospects for mobility within it.  Thus, 
in  more  recent  work  in  this  tradition,  the  concept  of  industrial  upgrading  figures 
prominently and many studies have focused on how a country’s industrial development 
                                                 
25 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994),  Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994). 
26 Some researchers asked why FDI had been associated with such different developmental outcomes in 
Latin America and in East Asia – why had FDI been growth producing in East Asia but exploitative and 
immiserising  in Latin America.  Gerrefi (1994) found that the answer lay in the fact that in Latin America 
multinationals had controlled producer-driven resource based industries with few local spillovers, while in 
East Asia, FDI had been associated with buyer-driven export oriented industries (apparel, toys).  Coupled 
with the way in which East Asian governments protected their domestic markets (from entry by western 
retailers),  and strategically promoted local industrial growth (Amsden 1989), the procurement oriented 
interests of industrial country retailers in East Asia had helped fueld exports and export-driven growth.    27 
trajectory or industrial upgrading prospects are shaped in different ways by participation 
in different kinds of value chains (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002. See Bair 2005 for a 
recent review).   
 
The  global  value  chain  can  be  analyzed  along  four  dimensions  according  to 
Gereffi (1994, 1995)—(1) Input-output structure, (2) territoriality (where the activities at 
each node of the chain are geographically carried out), (3) governance (or buyer-supplier 
relations)  and  (4)  Institutional  context.    Governance  of  the  chain  refers  to  who 
coordinates the various economic activities within the chain, how value is generated at 
each node and how it is distributed.  (Value is measured variously as profits, value added, 
or rates of return on investment).  The nature of the chain and its governance structure 
thus  become  key  variables  in  analyzing  how  power  or  control  is  exercised  in  global 
production  networks  and  how  upgrading  may  occur.  Institutional  context  refers  to 
national and international policies (trade policy, customs regimes) and the institutional 
frameworks that shape the processes of global production and exchange, and hence shape 
the character of the global value chains that emerge (See Smith et. al. 2002 on how the 
transformation  of  post-socialist  production  networks  and  the  specific  politics  of  EU 
accession have shaped quite distinct production chains relative to chains emerging out the 
US).   
 
The framework distinguishes between two types of commodity chains—‘producer 
driven’  and  ‘buyer  driven.’    In  producer  driven  commodity  chains,  large,  integrated 
(often  multinational)  firms  coordinate  production  networks  and  play  a  central  role  in 
controlling the industry’s backward and forward linkages  (Gereffi 1994, Thun 2000).  
Control of the chain is embedded in the lead firm’s control over production, and there are 
significant barrier to entry into product design and development due to high fixed and 
sunk costs and the presence of proprietary technology.  Capital and technology-intensive 
products such as automobiles and heavy machinery are classic examples of producer-
driven  chains.    Buyer-driven  commodity  chains  are  characterized  by  decentralized 
production networks, usually dispersed globally, that are coordinated by lead firms at the 
retail end who control design, marketing, and branding.  Control of the chain in this case   28 
is de-linked from production, and many of the most powerful branded retailers such as 
Nike and Liz Claiborne own no factories – they do not necessarily make in order to sell.  
Labor  intensive  sectors  such  apparel  (and  some  agricultural  products)  are  classic 
examples  of  buyer-driven  chains  where  large  retailers,  marketers  and  branded 
merchandisers, such as J.C. Penny, Reebok, Sears, Nike, Liz Claiborne and Wal-Mart, 
play pivotal coordinating roles (Gereffi 1999, Bair 2005).  
 
The global value chain framework’s main contribution was to situate the central 
role that retailers (commercial capital) were playing in organizing the global production 
and  distribution  of  apparel  and  textiles  since  the  1980s.    The  central  premise  of  the 
framework  was  that  market  access  into  key  industrial  markets  (quota  markets  till 
recently) such as the US and EU is controlled by powerful retailers and large branded 
merchandisers  who,  since  the  1970s  and  1980s  have  scoured  the  globe  for  low  cost 
suppliers  to  establish  elaborate,  globally  dispersed  clothing  supply  chains  which  they 
coordinate  and  drive.    As  Figure  1  shows,  retailers  who  coordinate  far-flung  global 
garment assembly and production networks  capture the bulk of the value generated in 
clothing exports because they control the highest value activities in the clothing chain – 
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Figure 2:  Comparison of the Flow of Value Added Across the Indian Clothing Value Chain: 
Evidence from Men’s Cotton Shirts and trousers 
Distribution of Value Added across the Indian Clothing Chain: 
Men's cotton shirts/unit, Men's Khaki causal trousers/unit
Men's Cotton** Shirts  Men's Khaki Trousers
  Global Retail   Global Retail
          (c.i.f)           (c.i.f)
  Value: $11.38   Value: $18.75
       VA: 57%        VA: 61%
    Manfacture     Manfacture
   Value: $4.93    Value: $7.25
        VA: 23%         VA: 19%
      Weaving       Weaving
   Value: $2.35    Value: $3.75
        VA: 12%         VA: 14%
      Spinning       Spinning
   Value: $1.03    Value: $1.13
         VA: 5%          VA: 3%
          Fibre           Fibre
    Value: $0.05     Value: $0.05
Value added: 4% Value added: 3%
Source: Calculated from KSA Technopak's analysis of value added at each stage of processing in India of Men's cotton 
shirts and khaki trousers.  * All costs, except retail, are based on input and manufacturing costs in India. 
Reported in: Singhal et. al. 2004, "Creating Value in the Textile and Apparel Supply Chain," Textile Outlook International,
January-February 2004 pp. 141.
**Poplin powerloom fabric  
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution and costs (value) as well as value added at each 
key stage of the production of men’s casual cotton shirts and Khaki trousers produced in 
India using Indian made fabric (based on survey data reported by KSA Technopak in 
Singhal 2004).  The calculations are on a per-unit basis.  The figures show that more than 
half  –  57  percent  --  of  the  value  of  men’s  casual  cotton  shirts  (valued  at  $11.40)  is   30 
generated at the level of retail where design, branding and marketing are controlled by 
the global buyer.  Actual store values may be even higher.  Twelve percent of the shirt’s 
value is added at the fabric stage and 23 percent in manufacturing.  The numbers are 
starker still for men’s trousers, where almost two-thirds of the value of men’s casual 
Khaki pants (61 percent) is added at the level of retail (controlled by global buyers), only 
19  percent  is  added  at  the  level  of  production  and  14  percent  at  the  level  of  fabric 
production.    India  is  a  relatively  late  entrant  into  global  apparel  exports,  and  global 
buyers have only just begun to organize buying networks there; among older apparel 
exporters these numbers may be even more stark.    
 
Globally, based on figures assembled by the United States International Trade 
Commission, it is striking to find that despite nearly three-quarters of all apparel exports 
originating from developing countries today, retailers and buyers in industrial countries 
still  control  a  bulk  of  the  value  added  (See  Table  5  below).    Though  there  are  few 
barriers to entry in apparel production (other than demands for scale and quality under the 
new competition), entry barriers rise as one moves up the chain toward higher value 
functions such as design and marketing.  The most lucrative portions of the value chain – 
design, distribution, branding and marketing -- therefore remain in the hands of industrial 
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Table 5:  Distribution of Global Value Added in Textiles and Apparel 
 
Distribution of the Global Share of Value-Added in Textiles and Apparel (Percentage)
1990 1995 2000
Textiles
Industrialized countries (Total)* 74.9 70.2 67.4
Developing Countries (Total)** 25.1 29.8 32.6
`
Apparel
Industrialized Countries (Total)* 75.5 74.9 71.9
Developing Countries (Total)** 24.7 25.1 29.1
Source - Calculated from US ITC 2004, Table 1-4, pp. 1-18.
* EU, North America, Japan, Eastern Europe and the former USSR
** North Africa, Sub-Saharn Africa, Latin America, South and East Asia (excluding China), West Asia and Europe
A glaring omission in these data is China's share of value added; but even assuming that China adds 10% to total value added,
 i.e., nearly half as much as all other developing countries combined -- a bulk of the share of value added still remains with 
global buyers and importers  
 
 
The distribution of value added across the supply chain is central to the global 
value chain framework’s attempt to turn the value chain heuristic into a mechanism for 
identifying the ‘levers of upgrading’ or potential development opportunities available to 
suppliers  (and  countries)  who  participate  at  different  nodes  in  various  clothing  value 
chains.    The  proponents  of  the  framework  argue  that  in  buyer-driven  chains  such  as 
textiles  and  apparel  for  example,  firms  in  low-wage,  industrializing  countries  are 
typically found at the bottom end of the commodity chain, engaged in assembly or basic 
production under specification from large retailers or marketers (or their agents), who 
define the product and its design and control its marketing and distribution—essentially 
determining ‘what is to be produced, when, how, .. how much and by whom (Humphrey 
and  Schmitz  2002:1021).    As  newer  countries  enter  into  export  markets,  and  as 
investment and export structures shift, the place of different countries in these commodity 
chains also changes, bringing with it the prospects for upgrading.   The contention of the 
GVC framework is that these changes, together with the understanding that suppliers gain 
over time of what the barriers to entry are at each successive node of the chain, and the 
skills and competencies required to enter higher value nodes, may enable assemblers to 
leverage this knowledge with the help of governments and local institutions to move up   32 
to  more  complex  roles  within  the  chain—such  as  “full-package  production,”  then  to 
original  equipment  manufacturing  (OEM)  and  eventually  to  original  brand-name 
manufacturing (OBM), where greater value can be captured (Gereffi 1999, Thun 2001). 
 
Figure 3:  Upgrading Across the Value Chain 
      Own
     Brand
      Mfg.
Full-Package
     OEM
Cut-Make-Trim
      CMT
       Job sew cut parts





A  major  challenge  for  firms  and  policymakers  in  industrializing  countries 
therefore,  according  to  the  GVC  framework,  is  to  understand  how  and  under  what 
conditions firms can move ‘up the value chain’ so that industrial upgrading may occur.  
The dangers are that low-end firms in low cost regions or countries may remain trapped 
at the lowest level of assembly—without acquiring the capabilities of moving into more 
complex production activities—and thus dependent on lead firms located in industrial 
countries.  If low costs are the only factor driving the lead firm’s sourcing decision from 
a particular set of firms, then such assemblers face the risk of being left behind when 
even-lower cost assemblers emerge in other countries (Thun 2000, Gereffi 1999, Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000).   
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Source: Adapted from Gereffi, 1994, p.112, and Gereffi 1999.  
 
Participation  in  different  kinds  of  chains  can  provide  suppliers  with  different 
kinds of learning and open up different pathways for upgrading. (see Table 4).  Thus, 
though there is a downward shifting of the costs of development and variability in nearly 
all cases from lead firms to their suppliers, continual pressure for cost reduction is likely 
to be felt most strongly if the supplier is stuck at the ‘lowest value more standardized 
nodes of the value chain’ or if the buyer services the low-end discount or mass markets 
(Herrigel,  2004).  For  example,  in  supplying  to  discount  chains  like  Walmart,  whose 
primary focus is on low-price, low margins, large volumes and timely deliveries, firms 
may make profits from large volumes, but learning – in terms of producing new, higher 
value  products  –  can  be  limited.    Branded  merchandisers,  such  as  Gap  or  Banana 
Republic by contrast look for suppliers with more complex capabilities than just volume, 
price and timeliness.  They expect a fuller range of services from their suppliers – an   34 
ability to deal with shorter runs of variable designs, short pre-production lead times (e.g., 
in design and prototype development), participation in sourcing, design, logistics, and 
possibly warehousing
27  -- and hence look beyond considerations of price to suppliers 
who have the requisite skills, resources, technology, capital equipments and productivity 
to work closely with lead firms (Herrigel 2004).  Where do these capabilities come from?  
How can firms move up (the so-called value chain) from simple assembly to acquiring 
more complex capabilities? 
 
Global value chain researchers have documented the possibilities of at least four 
types of upgrading within value chains:  (1) process upgrading – where suppliers carry 
out  existing  tasks  in  new  ways  so  as  to  improve  productivity,  performance  and 
profitability.  This may occur through the adoption of better technology, or the adoption 
of higher performance work systems and more effective organizational practices (such as 
just-in-time  inventory,  teams,  continuous  improvement,  six  sigma,  various  quality 
certifications such as ISO 9000, 14000, and more sophisticated reporting systems).   (2) 
Product upgrading: improved work performance may lead firms to move into higher 
value  product  varieties  that  fetch  them  higher  unit  values  (quality  upgrading).  An 
example would be shifting from producing standard low-cost  apparel to higher value 
shirts and jackets (3)  Functional upgrading, or acquiring new, higher value functions 
that  call  for  higher  skills  of  operation  –  such  as  integrating  design  and  product 
development with manufacturing, or integrating backwards into spinning and weaving 
from  garment  assembly,  or  forward  into  logistics,  warehousing,  distribution  and 
branding. In the garment industry this could mean moving from a cut and sew operation 
to full-package supply where a manufacturer independently sources fabric, accessories 
and combining design inputs with original equipment manufacturing.  Eventually, this 
can lead to the development of own brands, and thus ‘own-brand manufacturing,’ thus 
moving vertically up the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon 2005).  (4) Inter-sectoral or inter-chain upgrading: where firms use economies 
of scope or skills learned previously while carrying out one activity to move horizontally 
                                                 
27 However, these varied demands on suppliers do not automatically map into good working practices.  As 
some researchers have shown, higher end buyers (such as Liz Claiborne) may have just as exploitative 
work relations at the level of their suppliers, as price-conscious discount chains (Collins 2003?).   35 
to a new sector.  E.g, textile companies moving into sophisticated new fabrics used in 
non-apparel industries, such as automotive, aerospace and so forth.  As Gereffi points 
out,  lateral  diversification  of  this  sort  was  central  to  Taiwan’s  shift  into  more  skill-
intensive sectors.   
 
But how will all this come about? And what are the barriers to upgrading?  The 
value  chain  literature  provides  only  stylized  typologies.  It  provides  few  insights  into 
mechanisms  or  understandings  of  wider  institutional  processes  by  which  upgrading 
actually occurs, why it occurs in some cases, in and some places, and not it others. 
 
According to value chain researchers firms can upgrade depending on a number 
of factors – some specific to the nature of chain (or industry), some to their historical 
context, and some to their own capabilities.  According to the GVC framework, four 
features shape the entry barriers or the ease or difficulty of entering higher value nodes in 
a chain:  (1) the complexity of transactions, (2) degree to which information (about the 
skills and processes needed to operate at a node) can be codified (spelled out and made 
explicit  instead  of  remaining  tacit),  (3)  the  specific  demands  that  the  technology  or 
organization  of  production  places  on  suppliers  in  particular  industries    (such  as 
sophistication of technology and the costs of accessing it, the degree to which certain 
market  conditions,  such  as  time  to  market,  variability  of  design  are  critical  to 
competitiveness), and (4) the capability of the supplier.   
 
However, there may also be tensions between firms that occupy different nodes of 
a chain and between buyers and suppliers themselves that may inhibit upward mobility.  
For example, in a study of Brazil’s largest shoe cluster in the Sinos Valley, Schmitz 
found that the divergent interests of Brazilian firms situated at different ends of the value 
chain,  and  their  very  different  ties  with  their  American  buyers  made  upgrading  and 
adjustment difficult.  The Sinos Valley shoe cluster in South Brazil, dominated by small 
and medium firms till the 1970s, went through two kinds of divergent shifts with the 
arrival of US buyers in the late 1970s.  The American buyers sought to build a dedicated 
supply network, picking a few firms to tutelage, train, and grow, and placing large orders   36 
with them to encourage them to develop their own local supply chains.  In this first round 
of relationships, the US buyers were a key source of upgrading for the firms that were 
part of their value chain.  The buyers “studied the market, developed models and product 
specifications,  helped  producers  in  the  choice  of  technology  or  organization  of 
production, inspected quality on site, and organized transport, logistics and payments.”  
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002: 1023).  A clear division of labor evolved in the cluster – 
the Brazilian suppliers focused on production while the US buyers controlled product 
design, logistics and marketing.   
 
While initially this arrangement led to rapid growth and learning for the cluster as 
a whole, its limits soon became evident. By the early 1990s, when cheap Chinese shoes 
began to flood the US market, Brazilian exporters came under severe price pressures, 
including  from  their  own  buyer.    In  trying  to  get  out  of  direct  competition  with  the 
Chinese the local footwear association in Sinos Valley developed a collective initiative to 
move  up-market  and  raise  the  image  of  Brazil’s  shoes  worldwide  and  in  the  US.  
However, the upgrading never got off the ground – it was blocked by a subset of the 
cluster’s firms who directly exported to the US buyers as part of their direct supply chain.  
These exporters feared to encroach upon an activity – design and product development – 
that the buyer regarded as its turf and core competence.  The asymmetric and dependent 
relationship with a monopsonistic buyer thus derailed the cluster’s diversification (See 
Schmitz  1999  and  Humphrey  and  Schmitz  2002,  Schmitz  and  Knorringa  1999).  
Moreover,  those  occupying  higher  ends  of  the  value  chain  sought  to  monopolize  the 
activities at the preferred nodes by institutionally diminishing the degree of competition 
at the node of choice. 
 
  In the Indian apparel industry as well, similar trends are apparent in the way in 
which some cut-make-trim contractors describe their relationship with their buyers. One 
large CMT contract manufacturer based in Bangalore reported how they had experienced 
significant price deflation after the MFA was phased out in January 2005.
28  To deal with 
the continual pressure on prices the CMT exporter said they had never considered getting 
                                                 
28 In contrast to what full-package exporters in the same city had reported – of having been able to hold the 
line on prices so far, post-MFA.   37 
involved in design and pattern making for their buyers (several of whom were brand-
name  US  merchandisers)  because  “that  is  their  core  advantage.    Why  should  they 
continue to work with us if we compete with them on their own ground?”  (Interview, 
April 2005).  Instead the firm had invested in state of the art production planning and 
tracking systems to reduce wastage, improve consistency, increase productivity and shore 
up margins.  However, realizing the limits of the cost-cutting route, the firm was indeed 
planning to upgrade into design but in a different way – it was exploring partnerships 
with third-party designers and US department stores that needed to fill their racks with as 
much variety as possible. 
 
  It is however also important to not conflate the adoption by suppliers of higher 
value activities as necessarily voluntary – sometimes it may simply be the outcome of 
firms higher up the chain passing additional functions and tasks (logistics, warehousing) 
down to the supplier to defray its own risk and pare down costs (see Bair 2005, Smith et. 
al. 2004, Fitter and Kaplisnky 2001, Gibbon 2001, Dolan and Tewari 2001, Abernathy et. 
al 1999).  Is that really upgrading then?   Such firms, burdened by extra costs may well 
seek to pass them on to their own workers at the bottom of the chain – squeezing them 
without the basic job security, skills and working conditions associated with reaping the 
rewards of adding value.  In an environment where buyers increasingly demand good 
quality, consistency, timely delivery and low cost, this would be short-sighted indeed.   
 
  In some cases upgrading has occurred as a result of tutelage, knowledge transfer 
and feedback between global buyers at the head of particular value chains, and suppliers 
lower  down  the  chain.    For  example,  in  the  case  of  Mexico’s  apparel  industry, 
particularly  jeans,  as  described  in  Bair  and  Gereffi  2001,  2002  and  Rosenberg  2005, 
ongoing  feedback  from  US  retailers  (and  manufacturers  who  had  established  joint 
ventures in Mexico) led over time to the transformation of some Mexican suppliers from 
basic assembly in Maquiladoras to full-package supply as they absorbed more and more 
of the relatively higher value functions previously performed by their buyers – including 
pattern making, computerized cutting, fabric sourcing, packaging and distribution.  As 
shown in Table 5, over time many of Mexico’s Maquilas that began with export oriented   38 
assembly (such as Torreon’s blue jeans suppliers depicted below) have grown to perform 
many additional functions (the shown by the shaded parts in the table below.) 
 
Figure 5:  Rising to Full-Package in Mexico’s Blue Jeans Industry:  Torreon  in 1993-2000 
 
Functions  Performed by Mexican Suppliers for Contractual Exports to the US Market
The rise to full-package - 1993 - 2000 - in Torreon's Blue Jeans Industry
Function 1993 1996 2000
Textiles (fabric prodn.)
Trim and Labels








Source:  Bair and Gereffi, 2001, p. 1894.
The shaded rectangles reflect the operations that firms progressivley internalized.  
 
However,  this  ‘vertical  learning’  has  remained  narrowly  confined  to  a  small 
subset of large Mexican exporters and joint ventures.   For example, in Torreon’s jeans 
cluster,  depicted  in  the  chart  above,  the  top  ten  firms  were  large  –  with  individual 
production capacities ranging from 135,000 to nearly half a million pairs of jeans per 
week, and average employment of 3000 workers per factory.   Three of the ten were US 
subsidiaries, and one a joint venture, the remaining six were large Mexican firms.   Even 
among this elite group, only four firms were ‘full-package’ suppliers – i.e., they received 
an  order  from  their  buyer  and  delivered  the  final  product,  not  intermediates;    an 
additional four were “half-package” suppliers in that they carried out all of the production 
activities (cutting, sewing, laundering and finishing) but did nor procure the fabric or 
accessories (Bair and Gereffi 2001:1895-6).  Moreover, as other scholars have pointed 
out, these skills did not diffuse widely through the system to other firms (Piore et. al. 
1996,  2002).    The  onus  is  therefore  largely  on  domestic  institutions  –  industry 
associations, public agencies and local universities -- to put in place wider institutional 
processes that will enable firms to learn – outside of value chains – and transform their   39 
work practices and capabilities to meet the demands of competing in a volatile markets in 
the face of intense competition.
29 
 
Indeed, one study found that Mexico’s upgrading to ‘full-package’ was shaped in 
important ways by trade policies and the regulatory environment generated by its free-
trade agreement with the US and Canada. In a study of NAFTA’s effects on Mexico’s 
apparel industry, Gereffi and Bair (1998 cf. Bair 2005) show how the massive increase in 
Mexican apparel exports to the US just after NAFTA reflected in part the response of 
leading US textile firms and clothing buyers to make use of the rules of origin in the new 
trade regime that favored US textile companies ‘forwarding yarn’ and fabric to Mexico 
for  cutting,  sewing  and  assembly.  Encouraging  the  rise  of  Mexican  “full-package” 
suppliers was thus also an effort to overcome Asia’s lower cost textile exports to Latin 
America,  reduce US buyers’ dependence on Asian manufacturers and create a proximate 
base for rapid replenishment.  In the process, Mexican firms became inadvertently locked 
into specializing in a narrower range of items for which either the rules of origin were 
favorable  to  fabric  sourcing  from  the  US,  or  for  which  replenishment  demand  was 
especially high.  In the last few years firms in some key garment clusters in Mexico, such 
as Torreon, have turned themselves around by ceasing to compete with China for ‘long 
cycle  stock  production  items  by  becoming  a  flexible  producer  of  quick,  short-cycle, 
higher quality rapid replenishment orders (Rosenberg 2005).  In other cases innovative 
government-university  programs  run  in  partnership  with  business  associations  have 
helped upgrade the skills and design capabilities of local producers to sell both at home 
as well as in niche, export markets – not via global buyers, but beyond them (Lowe 
2003). 
   
                                                 
29 In recent years multilateral agencies like the ILO, UNIDO, and various national and local governments 
have used the global value chain framework to map out the place of their domestic industries within global 
value chains to see how they can improve their position and generate and retain greater value both in 
domestic and export markets. Similarly, with the growing importance of “credence goods” and corporate 
social responsibility, NGOs and anti-sweatshop activists have also used with some success the global value 
chain  framework  to  map  out  buyer-supplier  linkages  in  the  complex  and  fragmented  global  chains  to 
identify the points of leverage at which to bring pressure to bear on major global buyers such as Gap and 
Nike to promote better codes of conduct and working conditions for workers employed in their suppliers’ 
factories (Quan 2005, Bair 2005, Dolan 2004, O’Rourke 2002). 
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A second kind of learning – or movement up the value chain – is evident in the 
case of East Asian exporters, notably Taiwanese and South Korean firms who were the 
earliest to enter into buyer-driven exports of labor intensive goods for the US market.   
Their  ability,  over  long  years  of  production,  to  master  the  process  of  fulfilling  large 
orders  to  the  exact  specification  of  their  buyers  and  perfecting  their  ability  to  meet 
exacting  delivery  schedules  –  aided  crucially  by  public  sector  investments  in  ports, 
infrastructure and support institutions in their countries --  led to their rise as key middle-
men or organizers (and coordinators) of full-package supply for industrial country buyers.   
Supplying to low end buyers such as K-mart in the 1970s, Taiwanese and South Korean 
(and Hong Kong) firms moved to supplying department stores, then major brand-name 
merchandisers such as Liz Claiborne, the Gap, Donna Karan and finally acquired the 
knowledge and ability to not only contribute centrally to the design, development and 
production strategy of their customers (Ralph Lauren to Gap, to Nike to Armani), and 
hence gained power within the value chain.  One reason why East Asian suppliers were 
able to ‘rise up the value’ chain, when so many suppliers today get stuck at low-end 
segments of chain (e.g., the market-atrophying effects of suppliers ceding control over 
design to their global buyers as in the Brazilian case discussed above) could be the timing 
of the rise of East Asian exporters – in the late 1970s and early 1980s where there was 
less fierce global competition over apparel assembly and supply.  A more salient reason 
is offered by Tendler (2001), and that is that in the East Asian cases the domestic market 
was always an important market-creating complement to the export market.
30     
 
But most importantly, using the tacit knowledge as well as the specific experience 
they gained about production management, many Taiwanese, South Korean and Hong 
Kong based apparel exporters, by the late 1980s and 1990s came to act as intermediaries 
for global buyers, distributing their orders widely across lower cost producers in Asia, 
                                                 
30 It appears that similar changes may be occurring in China and India today.   A recent account reported, 
for example, how after the re-imposition of quotas on Chinese garment exports by the US and EU in June-
July 2005, some large producers are turning to the domestic market for sales.  With a growing middle-class 
with substantial purchasing power, this producer not only found that local consumers had money to spend 
on expensive clothing, but that there was a vast untapped domestic demand for good quality apparel.  This 
firm thus not only comfortably sold all the items turned back by US and EU port authorities, but is adding a 
thousand more workers to increase capacity to cater to the domestic market (New York Times, October 20, 
2005).   41 
Africa, and other countries (wherever quotas were available) and managing the process of 
input supply, production coordination and final dispatch of finished goods.  These firms 
learned  foreign  languages,  made  regular  visits  to  sites  of  triangle  production  (South 
Africa, Latin America, East Asia), used modern technologies (quick response electronic 
data interchange systems to communicate with their clients and focused their efforts on 
achieving consistency, quality and timely supply from their dispersed subcontractors (See 
Gereffi 1999, Berger Gartner and Karty 1997).   
 
Spurred by retail competition in industrial markets and the growing movement 
among  US  retailers  to  ‘buy  direct’  in  the  1980s  (Gereffi  and  Pan  1994),  these 
intermediaries became “one-stop-shops” for US and European buyers.  Referred to as 
“triangle manufacturing” (Gereffi 1994) this process of the emergence of large, capable 
and quite powerful contractors within global value chains defines an important shift in 
the exercise of power within these clothing chains.  In a world of volatile demand and 
shortened product cycles, this mutual dependence of the buyer and the supplier gave 
tremendous clout to this new tier of actors.  
 
The Hong Kong based garment trading company, Li & Fung is a classic example 
of this kind of intermediary.
31  Originally an exporter of silk and porcelain from China, Li 
& Fung began to export garments and other manufactured goods to the US and Europe in 
the post-war period.  With the rise of textile quotas under MFA, the company began to 
buy and sell quotas in the 1970s and 1980s and soon became an expert buyer and broker 
of quotas under MFA.  In the course of its quota trades it established extensive links with 
thousands of Asian garment suppliers as well as with other suppliers and retailers across 
the supply chain.  During the 1980s when more and more US and European retailers 
sought to by-pass importers and source directly from manufacturers, Li & Fung became a 
broker and coordinator of regional production chains in Asia on behalf of foreign buyers.  
By 2001 it had 7,500 suppliers in 40 countries around the world, including India.  In 
recent years Li & Fung has moved into “product development, raw-material sourcing, 
                                                 
31 This account is drawn from Abernathy Volpe and Weil 2004.  For other discussions see Loveman nad 
O’Connell 1996.   42 
production planning, manufacturing control, quality assurance, export documentation and 
shipping consolidation” (Abernathy et. al. 2004). Most recently it entered into a licensing 
agreement  with  Levi’s  to  design,  manufacture  and  market  men’s  tops  under  various 
Levi’s labels and branded jeans in the US market. 
 
The  most  significant  shifts  that  make  global  intermediaries  such  as  these 
tremendously powerful is the rise of ‘Lean Retailing’ and the growing importance of 
timeliness in the sourcing and supply of apparel.  It is to this issue that we turn to next. 
 
Section 4:  Lean Retailing, and Specialization: The return of proximity as a driver 
of apparel sourcing and supply.  
 
Dramatic shifts in information technology have transformed the structure of retail 
in  recent  years,  and  with  it,  the  textile,  apparel  and  retail  relationship.    These  new 
technologies, such as quick response electronic data interchange systems that transmit 
point  of  sale  information  to  the  supplier  in  real  time,  have  provided  retailers  and 
producers  new  and  innovative  ways  of  dealing  with  the  volatility  and  uncertainty  of 
global markets. 
 
For example, take the case of a discount retailer such as Walmart or a department 
store such as Dillards.  Walmart operates 5000 stores worldwide, and with annual sales 
nearing  $300  billion,  Walmart’s  revenues  are  larger  than  Switzerland’s  (Lichtenstein 
2005).  Even with scales such as these, Walmart owns no factories.  It sources its entire 
product from the thousands of suppliers it contracts with around the world, 3000 of them 
in China contributing nearly $23 billion in sales.  In moving volumes such as these to its 
global  consumers,  Walmart  carries  virtually  no  inventory.    Using  sophisticated 
technology and state of the art logistic management systems, Walmart “tracks consumer 
behavior with meticulous care and then transmits consumer preferences down the supply 
chain.  Replenishment is set into motion immediately, with suppliers required to make 
more frequent deliveries of smaller and smaller lots” (Lichtenstein 2005: 13).  To make 
this giant just-in-time inventory system work Walmart has mastered “lean retailing.”  For 
example, in its dealings with  Proctor and Gamble (P&G) and its suppliers, Walmart used   43 
its tracking technologies to gather highly detailed information about consumer tastes and 
used it to source its home care products from P&G’s supply chain much more accurately 
and  profitably.    By  insisting  that  suppliers  implement  information  technologies  for 
exchanging  sales  data,  adopt  standards  for  product  labeling  and  use  modern  material 
handling processes, Walmart conveyed continuous data on sales, inventories, and prices 
to P&G via satellite, enabling it to replenish its goods rapidly, accurately and most often, 
directly  from  the  suppliers’  factories  to  individual  stores  (Abernathy  et.  al  1999, 
Lichtenstein 2005). 
 
Lean Retailing (see Abernathy et.al. 1999) refers to a set of business practices that 
allow buyers to manage risk in a volatile and uncertain business environment by sourcing 
in  short,  frequent  cycles.  This  process  of  rapid  replenishment  allows  retailers  like 
Walmart, Dillards and scores of others, to respond quickly to variable demand without 
holding large inventories.  Short lead times (or quick turnaround times) are critical for 
rapid replenishment.  Buyers may replenish their stocks fortnightly, weekly, or even more 
frequently. These changes allow retailers to lower the costs of carrying variable designs 
while avoiding the trap of over-capacity and large inventories.   
 
Lean  retailing  is  supported  by  sophisticated  information  technologies,  and 
logistics systems.  Information technologies such as Electronic Data Interchanges (EDI) 
and  bar-codes  that  allow  point-of-sale  information  to  be  instantly  transmitted  to  the 
suppliers’ shopfloor – informing suppliers how much of a particular time-sensitive item 
has  been  sold  on  a  daily  basis.    Increasingly,  production  tracking  systems  based  on 
computer chips embedded in individual items that allow retailers to gauge the progress of 
an order – or its dispatch – in real-time are critical for Lean retailing to work.  Equally 
critical are new forms of warehousing and sophisticated logistics and distribution systems 
that can quickly move goods from suppliers to the retailers’ shelves (Abernathy 1999). 
 
The  importance  of  ‘timeliness’  in  Lean  Retailing  has  thus  made  proximate 
locations important in the sourcing decisions of buyers for fast-moving or quick-selling 
items,  over  and  above  considerations  of  cost.    For  example,  although  labor  costs  in   44 
Mexico are more than three times China’s, US retailers source their replenishable items, 
such as jeans and T-Shirts, much more heavily from Mexico than from China.  In 2003, 
US buyers sourced over $4 billion worth of replenishable products from Mexico and the 
Caribbean  Basin  (amounting  to  22%  of  all  apparel  sourced  from  these  countries) 
compared to $1.3 billion from China and other Asian countries (Abernathy et. al. 2004).  
Thus, the argument that the Lean Retailing literature makes is that despite lower factor 
costs  in  countries  like  China  and  India,  proximate  locations  closer  to  the  US  –  e.g, 
Mexico, the Caribbean basin, and Central America – will continue to be important sites 
for the sourcing of items that are replenishable.
 32  Using data from US retailers, and their 
Mexican  and  Asian  sourcing  patters,  one  study  found  that  for  products  with 
replenishment needs of 10 percent, imports from nearby countries grew 37% faster (than 
from other locations.)  With replenishment needs of 25% or higher, imports from nearby 
countries (Mexico) grew 45 percent faster than imports from more showed that products 
where rapid-replenishment was important grew much more rapidly from nearby sources 




Traditional analyses hold that ‘manufacturing performance is determined by the 
labor  time  required  to  produce  an  item,’  but  scholars  studying  modern  production 
systems such as lean retailing argue that ‘direct labor content is not the primary issue’  
(Abernathy  et.  al  1999).  They  find  that  companies  that  have  adopted  the  new 
management  practices,  the  new  information  technologies  and  the  new  organizational 
practices are the strongest performers, rather than those who merely improve their cost 
competitiveness.  Comparing those who hold the lowest inventories (work in process and 
finished) and have the most flexibility to respond to changing market conditions, with 
those who focus primarily on cutting costs, these scholars find that they find that under 
current conditions of volatility and demand for timely delivery and rapid replenishment, 
“the sourcing option that offers the lowest direct cost is not always the most profitable” 
(Abernathy et. al. 1999: 126). 
                                                 
32 Specifically, “goods that are ordered more than once per season are called replenishable, while goods that 
are ordered only once per season are ‘non-replenishable’ (Evans and Harrigan 2005:294).     45 
 
Section 5: A Word About China  
 
In closing, I want to revisit the question of China and its remarkable performance 
in  textile  and  apparel  exports  in  recent  months  (after  the  removal  of  quotas, 
notwithstanding the recent re-imposition of restraints on it by the US and EU), and over 
the past two decades – ever since it came from behind to dominate global textile and 
apparel trade in 1998.  I will make three points in this section. 
 
Much has been written about China’s low costs of production and its large scales 
of  operation.    Indeed,  China’s  already  large  factories  are  becoming  even  larger,  and 
together with Hong Kong based firms, are emerging as something of a model of the kinds 
of industrial organization – ‘mega suppliers’ with operations in sites around the globe – 
that can take on the power of giant retailers and corporations such as Walmart (Richard 
Appelbaum 2005).  For example, a factory complex in Dongguan employs more than 
40,000 workers; its new Vietnam based operations will hire 65,000 workers—perhaps the 
largest  under  a  single  roof  in  the  world;  other  globalizing  Chinese  companies  have 
workers in the range of 150,000-170,000 worldwide (Lichtenstein 2005).  As we noted 
earlier in the paper, China’s superior export (and economic) performance, its large scapes 
of operations and its low costs of production have led many countries, firms and policy 
makers to focus on scaling up and reducing costs as a way to compete with and emulate 
China.   Thus, the first point I want to make is that while clearly, size is important, 
especially in the case of China, the benefits of low cost and large scale production are 
easier  to  posit  than  to  realize  in  an  environment  where  demand  is  unpredictable  and 
highly volatile.  As we saw above, even the largest of firms are adopting a whole array of 
production practices and technologies that overcome the ‘costs’ of scale – i.e., rigidity, 
high inventories and narrow specialization.  Without the ability to respond flexibly in a 
fast changing competitive environment, scale can be a burden. 
 
The second point, therefore, is that China’s low cost (CMT) model (of large runs 
and big volumes) is embedded within a range of other capabilities that allow production   46 
benefits  to  be  realized  more  widely.    In  the  Chinese  case  several  factors  have  come 
together to alleviate the ‘costs of scale,’ so that even though, on the face of it China 
follows the classic CMT production model in apparel and textiles that has trapped many 
smaller  supplier  countries  in  dependent  relationships  with  their  global  buyers,  the 
outcome  in  China  is  relatively  different.    (It  is  important  to  be  clear  here  that  labor 
conditions  remain  hugely  regressive  in  scores  of  Chinese  factories  (piece  rates,  long 
hours of work, no over time), but they are not monolithically bad across all factories nor 
the main reasons for Chinese superior productivity.)  China’s advantage rests not only on 
its low cost production operations, but how these operations are combined with two of 
the most important assets that allow its large scale operations to elude rigidities:  the 
presence downstream (forward linkages) of the hundreds of highly experienced, and by 
now powerful, global intermediaries from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea who 
manage the “Traingle  Manufacturing” networks of apparel production, and who have 
honed their skills at producing – and getting other suppliers to produce -- output of good 
and consistent quality in a timely and adaptable way and at reasonable costs.  As we saw, 
these firms have focused laser-like over the last decades to refine their ability to turn out 
goods of reliably good quality on time – meeting strict delivery schedules over and over 
again.  It is this ‘value,’ of timeliness, consistency and quality, over and above low prices 
and volumes, that induces buyers in the US and Europe to negotiate large and repeated 
contracts  with  East  Asian  and  Chinese  producers.    By  1995,  Hong  Kong  SAR 
entrepreneurs operated over 20,000 factories and employed an estimated 41/2 to 5 million 
workers in China’s Pearl River Delta alone (De Coster 1996 cf. Gereffi 1999, Berger, 
Gartner and Karty 1997).  Since then, this number has only increased.  This insertion of 
Chinese  producers  into  sophisticated  and  highly  internationalized  marketing, 
management, design and distribution networks completely changes the valence between 
an  ordinary  CMT  operation  based  on  low  margins  and  long  runs,  and  the  kinds  of 
networks that are taking shape in China.  
 
The other piece that changes the China story from being one of low costs and 
large  scale  alone  to  something  much  more  is  its  embeddedness  upstream  (backward 
linkages) into a robust and diversified textile, accessories and inputs industry.  China is   47 
among the largest producers of a wide range of fabric, and together with Hong Kong 
SAR’s  entrepreneurs  has  proximate  access  to  some  of  the  largest  apparel  accessory 
markets in East Asia.   China’s capability is therefore not only to assemble low cost 
apparel, but in its ability to link it directly with its large textile industry and input base.  
Today, when the dominant view, post-MFA is  that rapidly  consolidating retailers are 
increasingly reluctant to “move fabric around the world” (Tesco Interview, 2005), this 
linkage with a powerful textile industry is a major advantage. The government has played 
a  central  role  in  bringing  inputs  –  of  all  kinds  –  spatially  together  in  sites  where 
production takes place.  Seeing this rich input and institutional base, as well as productive 
capacity, the Textile, Chemical and Dyes association of the US decided in 2000-1 to open 
some of its largest and most sophisticated wet-processing operations in China (Interview, 
North Carolina, 2002).   
 
Under  these  conditions,    the  scale  of  China’s  production  capacities,  their 
continually evolving quality, and the continuity of big orders (despite the recent safe-
guard measures) also gives Chinese firms the financial ability to access capital and new 
technology to upgrade their production process continuously e.g., China has been able to 
upgrade  its  production  technology  rapidly  in  recent  years  and  the  latest  machines 
imported  from  Germany,  Italy,  Japan  and  the  US  is  in  use  in  many  of  its  plants 
(Appelbaum 2005).   Similarly, the massive scale of production and repeat orders from 
giant  retailers  gives  Chinese  firms  the  power  to  put  pressure  on  fabric  producers  to 
constantly innovate to keep prices low.    Thus, as many have argued, the Chinese are 
masters  of  the  CMT  model  (Gibbon  2005),  but  their  assets  are  not  only  their  large 
production  capacity  and  the  related  economies  of  scale  and  scope,  but  their  close 
embedding  within  the  higher  value  added  functions  of  full-package  supply  of  the 
Taiwanese,  Hong  Kong  and  South  Korean  turn-key  suppliers  who  have  decades  of 
experience working with US buyers, and an excellent understanding of the demands of 
the American (and European) consumer market.  The point is that, scale, without the 
Chinese mastery over lean production, consistent and timely delivery, and their reciprocal 
access to key global buyers and intermediaries would only add to overheads. 
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My  final  point  is  that  these  advantages  of  production  and  market  access  that 
China enjoys today have been actively shaped by government policy over time. In the 
next few paragraphs I describe brief innovations of policy in the re-making of China’s 
textile industry to illustrate my point.  (This material is drawn primarily from Chandra 
1998).  When the Chinese government began to promote the textile industry as a key 
growth sector in 1978, it made two decisions. The first was to thoroughly modernize the 
textiles sector technologically; and the second was to link this infusion of new technology 
(and other initiatives) to a particular, strategic goal—of building market share.  This goal 
of  building  up  market  share  shaped  the  nature  of  the  government’s  modernization 
program.  
 
Chinese firms have invested over $1billion annually in the import of new cotton 
and silk processing equipment since 1985.  The state run Beijing Cotton Mill alone has 
invested close to $1 billion in new equipment over the past ten years.  These investments 
have  gone  into  new  machinery  (such  as  rotor  machines,  and  shuttle-less  looms  in 
spinning mills), as well as into new and innovative production systems such as statistical 
process control capabilities and machines that detect in-process defects.  Between 1987 
and 1996, for example, China invested in 68,000 modern shuttle-less looms while Indian 
firms invested only 8000 such looms in the same period (Chandra 1998).
33  Similarly, 
with the use of better equipment, and key organizational changes, China’s defect rates are 
half those of Indian textile firms (3-5% in India, compared to 1-3% in China, and 0.01-
1% in advanced industrial countries like Canada.) [Even today, post-MFA Chinese firms 
increased investment in textiles and apparel by $13 billion compared to just under $2 
billion in India (Business Standard 2005).] 
 
But the government did not see the technological upgrading of the textile industry 
as a goal in-itself, rather it was a means for increasing China’s market share at both, the 
low-cost, high volume and the high value-added, low-volume ends of the global market.  
Exports were key to this two-pronged strategy, as was the central role played by Chinese 
expatriates  from  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  Europe,  and  the  US  as  “market-makers”  and 
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investors in new  factories within China, as  well as key links to new  markets abroad 
(Chandra 1998).    In this regard, Chinese firms and the  government have also made 
significant organizational changes in the textile industry.  First, China has improved the 
quality of the textile sector’s supply chain management by revamping input supply and 
raw-material  quality  at  one  end,  and  investing  heavily  in  improving  the  quality  of 
finishing and dyeing processes at the other end.   At least in the export sector, the Chinese 
government has also invested in developing new and improved yarn varieties, and helped 
firms  adopt  improved  measurement  and  control  systems  that  operate  throughout  the 
production chain, and limit wastage by helping detect defects.  This is just the area where 
Indian industry is weakest. Several analysts have found that the absence of good quality 
finishing and dyeing, and poor quality or defective yarn, are key factors that limit the 
entry of Indian textile firms into higher-end markets (Belliti 1998, Chandra 1998). 
 
Organizational change has also occurred at the inter-firm level in the Chinese 
textile industry.  For example, as we noted above, Chinese exporters have reorganized 
production to improve delivery times, speed up the flow of information and products 
between producers and suppliers, and hence cut down on the need for in-process and 
input inventories.  In 1998, according to one study, only 11 percent of textile firms in 
China held 75 days worth of raw-material inventories, compared to over 36 percent of 
Indian firms. These inventories have fallen much lower in recent years, even as time to 
market has improved greatly (Chandra 1998, Berger, Gartner and Karty 1997) 
 
The  Chinese  government’s  efforts  to  combine  technological  change  with 
organizational change and to not view technical upgrading as an end in itself, but as a 
means to market growth, illustrates a crucial, larger point that there are limits to relying 
exclusively on technological upgrading as a means of improving firm-competitiveness.   
(For example, involving new equipment, better plant infrastructure, improved transport, 
handling,  storage,  logistics,  and  process  control  mechanisms),  the  most  impressive 
productivity  gains  have  come  from  process  improvements,  and  adopting  new 
organizational practices, in addition to or along-side new capital investments.   
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Indian firms, by contrast, have often pursed technology for technology’s sake, and 
the way in which the government’s modernization programs are designed, reinforces this 
bias.  A recent study of machinery-use by engineering firms in five countries--India, 
China, Thailand, Korea, and the US--sponsored by the German Machine Tools found that 
in India most managers interviewed said productivity increases needed state of the art 
technology.  Chinese firms, by contrast, were interested only in that level of technology 
that would help them secure wider access to markets abroad.  They emphasized market 
access  as  the  primary  goal  of  production  reform,  and  viewed  new  machinery  and 
equipment in that light: as only one of many elements in a strategy that would help them 
increase their market share at both high and low ends of the product market (Meil, ISF, 
1998). 
 
The Chinese government is similarly strategic.  In the textile industry case, the  
government  did  two  things  to  strengthen  the  textiles  production  chain  where  it  was 
weakest.  First, it removed uncertainty around the access that firms had to raw materials 
by  establishing  new  procurement  arrangements.  For  example,  the  government  set  up 
institutions to channel raw materials and finished goods through regional pools.  This 
pooled arrangement not only removed the uncertainty that firms had experienced around 
the  availability  of  good  quality  domestic  and  imported  raw  materials;    But  in  taking 
advantages of the scale economies that regional pooling offered, the government also 
lowered the cost to firms of imports and marketing.  Second, the government improved 
the coordination across the production chain by making a single authority responsible for 
all permits, sales, and export formalities. A single apex body for each sub-sector handles 
all export formalities and coordinates across all the related sub-sectors in the production 
chain. 
 
  The  government  moreover,  demanded  reciprocity  and  maintained  the  capacity  to 
discipline firms.  In return for its support to the Textile Industry, the Chinese government 
demanded improved output and productivity from firms (especially exporters) and has 
instituted built-in disciplinary mechanisms to enhance compliance and firm performance. 
For example, wage increases--indeed wage bills-- for all Public Sector Units (PSUs) are   51 
tied to output levels, and benefits are linked to productivity increases.  Managers of PSU 
are part of a “responsibility” system where they retain a share of their export revenues 
beyond a threshold of performance (Walder 1995 cf. Chandra 1998).  Because each PSU 
must  furnish  its  own  foreign  exchange  to  buy  new  equipment  or  carry  out  other 
restructuring, this incentive of retaining a part of their export earnings has driven many 
firms to export.  Exports, clearly, are a key way for firms to earn revenues to purchase 
new  technology  and  pay  for  process-oriented  changes  that  help  firms  improve 
productivity,  which  in  turn  helps  them  win  other  support  from  the  government.  The 
government has also encouraged a “market” for innovation; and innovators periodically 
get together and sell their innovations to firms (Chandra 1998). 
 
A related collaborative function between firms, workers and government agencies 
is  the  provision  of  adequate  and  modernized  training  to  industrial  workers  and  firm 
managers.  The Chinese government has focused heavily on providing strong support for 
technical  training  as  well  as  educational  programs  related  to  the  textiles  industry.  
Chinese firms, in turn, have also invested heavily in training their workforce in modern 
technology and management skills.  For example, even seven years ago, a Chinese firm, 
on average, provided about 70 hours of training per year to its workers and managers 
compared to only ten hours in India. (Chandra 1998).  China’s advantages in textiles and 
apparel,  beyond  its  low  production  costs,  have  been  actively  shaped  by  government 
policy and public action.  Even as scale economies proliferate, a new more value adding, 
variable and flexible production system is simultaneously taking root. 
 
Section 6: Conclusions 
 
This paper reviewed the ongoing debate about the effects of quota removal on the 
competitiveness of apparel and textile firms, and the fortunes of supplier countries after 
the removal of global quotas.  There is deep anxiety among many firms and supplier 
countries about their ability to hold their place in the global division of labor in textiles 
and apparel post-MFA given powerful trends toward consolidation of retailer networks 
and the widely anticipated shift of market share (and market power) towards Chinese   52 
textile  and  apparel  exporters.    The  standard  models  on  the  effects  of  quota  removal 
predict stark shifts of market share toward large, formerly constrained apparel suppliers 
such as China and secondarily India and countries like Mexico.  Most of these models are 
based on traditional variables of competitiveness and trade – cost-competitiveness, price, 
technical change, tariffs, exchange rates, and scale -- the ability of producers to harness 
economies  of  scale  and  scope  to  meet  the  demands  of  rapidly  consolidating  global 
buyers. 
 
The motivation for the review was to pull together arguments that have recently 
been made in the institutional literature that links industrial organization and global trade 
in textiles to caution against the notion that cost, scale and relative prices are the only 
metrics of global competitiveness in the textiles and apparel industry post-MFA.  The 
paper  reviewed  arguments  and  evidence  to  make  several  points.  First,  that  under  the 
volatile market conditions that prevail today, it is not only price or cost competitiveness 
that matters, but the ability of firms for ongoing adjustment (Sabel and Reddy 2002).  
Second, that the changed market conditions make many more demands on firms (and 
exporters) in addition to price.  Under conditions of intensified global competition, short 
product cycles and fragmented demand, buyers demand flexibility, good quality, variety, 
consistency and timeliness in addition to price.   
 
In  response  to  these  demands  firms  have  developed  strategies  that  can  be 
classified  as  ‘low  road’  or  ‘high  road.’    Though  portrayed  dichotomously,  these 
distinctions nevertheless capture paths to development and export competitiveness that 
focus primarily on low wages (low road) versus those that embody a new class of higher 
performance work practices that combine progressive labor practices, innovation, human 
capital development, technical progress and organizational flexibility. 
 
We  saw  how,  on  the  one  hand,  the  rise  of  regional  trade  agreements,  new 
demands of ‘Lean Retailing,’ (low inventories, rapid, short-cycle replenishment of fast-
moving items, and the privileging of proximity for the sourcing of such items) and the 
growing  power  of  global    retailers  in  organizing  trade  and  sourcing  networks  and   53 
managing far-flung clothing value chains has made trade “sticky” – in that the removal of 
quotas  does  not  mean  trade  is  “free”  or  that    the  most  cost-efficient  supplier  will 
automatically win out.  Embedded buyer-seller relationships, and the differential ability 
of  suppliers  to  meet  the  several  other,  non-price  criteria  that  buyers  demand  will  be 
equally,  if  not  more  critical  in  shaping  the  new  geography  of  textile  and  apparel 
production, sourcing and supply post-MFA.  On the other hand, we saw how agency – the 
role of the government, support institutions and inter-firm relations – is key even in cases 
where cost and volume seem to supposedly dominate, such as in China. 
 
The broad lessons of the evidence reviewed in this paper are that in a rapidly 
changing productive environment, and in an industry as footloose as apparel, a strategy 
that focuses on low wages as the sole or primary source of advantage is chimeric and 
seriously short-sighted.  As some of the authors reviewed in the paper have pointed out 
(Berger, Gartner and Karty 1997, Piore 2002, Sabel and Reddy 2002, Tendler 2005), the 
deep vulnerability of this system of production comes from three sources:  First, a low 
wage strategy lasts only as long as the next low wage site comes along.  It leaves a 
country or a region with no special advantage that can cause investment and exports and 
the ensuring linkages to “stick” locally because there are scores of countries and regions 
that can organize production on the basis of cheap labor, low skills and mass volumes in 
ways that will generate goods that can be sold in low end markets of affluent countries, in 
the  domestic  market,  or  among  peer  nations.    But  it  is  in  these  segments  that  price 
competition is the most fierce, with continuous pressures to cut costs, erode wages, living 
conditions and ultimately, the sustainability (or developmental capacity) of such a model.   
Second,  a  low  wage,  low  road  model  distances  just  those  resources,  conditions  and 
opportunities that producers need to upgrade their capacities, products and production 
processes.    Unable  to  absorb  the  tremendous  potential  in  new,  high  productive, 
innovative work practices as well as technologies, such an approach pushes regions to an 
inexorable race to the bottom.  This is mirrored in the dead-end development strategies 
that the low road leads us to – based as it is on attracting orders, or buyers, or FDI by 
offering cost advantages on the basis of low wages, dismantled labor laws, tax-incentives, 
cheap  land  and  natural  resources  (Piore  2002).    This  downward  spiral  of  zero-sum   54 
giveaways not only denudes local resources and capabilities, but ever so often leaves 
regions biting the dust when even ‘better,’ lower-cost incentives are offered by the next 
region, or state or country.  
 
Finally, even when caught in a low-wage, low road trap, prices, land values, even 
wages rise, limiting the gains that can be squeezed out of such a system (Berger and 
Lester 1997).  Without embracing the technological advances that are underway, building 
up  the  human  capital  and  the  skills  that  can  use  these  technologies  to  generate 
innovations and productivity gains, which translate into high value products, access to 
new  markets  and  production  processes  and  better  returns  as  well  as,  in  turn,  better 
working  and  living  conditions,  the  global  and  national  competitiveness  of  industrial 
work, especially in textiles and apparel, is likely to remain incomplete and unrealized.  
 
As the evidence reviewed in this paper points out, ample opportunities exist for 
communities, countries and firms to build a more lasting competitive advantage that is 
based  on  the  creation  of  deeper  capabilities.    These  capabilities  involve  creativity  in 
production,  skill  formation,  technological  innovation,  R&D,  and  innovations  in 
marketing and distribution,  along with the creation of support institutions that will help 
nurture  the  high  road,  allowing  firms  and  workers  to  continually  adapt  to  volatile 
markets. Such capabilities are founded on and in turn create locally-rooted capacities and 
interdependencies  among  firms,  workers  and  suppliers  that  can  generate  unique 
advantages (Piore 2002, Tendler 2001) that “stick” in place, and grow and change in 
response to the demands of a dynamic competitive environment.  Under such conditions 
costs and scale are not dichotomous to niches and small batches, but complementary parts 
of a broad-based process of development and innovation. 
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